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Abstract 
 
 
The goal of this research is to suggest a framework for developing measures of 
success for corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives.  Because this research is 
exploratory, it focuses on only one initiative:  the 2002 Lighting Bolt initiative “Focus on 
results, not process.”  A qualitative method approach was used to suggest a four part 
framework.  Through the review of literature, common steps for creating metrics were 
established and recurrent characteristics of good metrics were identified.  Then interviews 
were conducted with acquisition practitioners who have experience with the initiative.  
Finally, those three parts were applied to the initiative as a case study and metrics 
suggested as a result.   
This study gives Air Force leaders clear, implementable metrics that can be used 
as measures of success for the initiative, and provides recommendations to improve this 
initiative’s performance and that of future corporate Air Force acquisition initiatives.  
This study also gives leaders insight into whether or not this initiative and others like it 
are an appropriate and effective way to drive the changes they are meant to bring about.  
Finally, from a broader perspective, the framework used in this study can be used to 
develop metrics for other corporate level initiatives. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES OF SUCCESS  
FOR CORPORATE LEVEL AIR FORCE ACQUISITION INITIATIVES 
 
 
 
I.  Research Foundation 
 
Background 
Almost since its inception in 1947, the Air Force has sought to reform the way it 
procures weapon systems.  Many factors involved in the weapon system acquisition 
process are external to the Air Force and out of its control (i.e., Congressional constraints, 
the pace of technology development, weapon system requirements constantly changing as 
real world needs dictate).  However, self-imposed administrative hurdles are an internal 
factor that the Air Force can change in order to help improve its procurement practices. 
To target the elements of the acquisition process within the Air Force’s control, 
the Air Force began implementing a series of acquisition reform initiatives in 1995.  
These initiatives, referred to as “Lightning Bolts,” were created in direct response to Air 
Force leadership’s growing concerns that it takes too long to put weapon systems in the 
hands of the warfighters (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003; Department of 
the Air Force, 1:10 July 2003).  Collectively, their purpose is to serve as the catalyst by 
which administrative changes are made in Air Force business practices (Senate Armed 
Services Committee, 2002).  However, little is known about how to gauge the success of 
these initiatives.  Many metrics have been suggested for gauging the success of 
acquisition reform attempts within the Department of Defense (DoD), but most of the 
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metrics remain slated for use only in individual acquisition program offices (Pope, 
1997:75-77).  No list of standard metrics exists, and there are no generally applicable and 
logical methods to measure the performance of acquisition reform initiatives today 
(Beamon, 1999; Pope, 1997:75-77).  Accordingly, this project is designed to help better 
understand these initiatives and how to establish acquisition based measures of success. 
Gaining a better understanding of the aspects of metric development, and 
identifying the recurrence of those aspects among multiple authors, will enable this 
research to create a model upon which acquisition based metrics can be built.  That model 
will then be applied to the 2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, 
not process” as a case study. 
 
Problem Statement 
 Senior Air Force leaders need to know how well the Lightning Bolt 2002 
initiatives are achieving their intended objectives.  This research will develop the means 
to measure how successfully the Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process” 
is achieving its objectives.  As a result, this research will create a model for developing 
measures of success that can be applied to larger, corporate level Air Force acquisition 
initiatives. 
 
Methodology 
This research uses a qualitative research method approach.  Qualitative data will 
be collected and analyzed initially, followed by an independent evaluation of the 
findings.  The qualitative research will use a case study to develop measures of success 
for the initiative of interest, and evaluate the effectiveness of that initiative in the 
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conclusions and recommendations stage.  As part of future research, quantitative data can 
help reinforce and confirm the qualitative results. 
 
Outline 
 Chapter two (Literature Review) provides a history of the Lightning Bolt 2002 
acquisition initiatives, and explains why metrics are important to use and their 
composition.  It also provides a description of the general steps to creating metrics and 
the characteristics that good metrics have.  It then discusses how metrics are applicable to 
acquisition reform initiatives. 
 Chapter three (Methodology) describes the methodology for the study, including 
the interview process used for data collection, the spiral method that will be used to 
analyze the data, the techniques used to validate the analysis, and the methods used to 
identify a generalized three step process for creating metrics and the core attributes of 
good metrics. 
 Chapter four (Data Analysis) provides an analysis of interview data collected and 
an explanation of the resulting themes that evolved.  Those results are then tailored to the 
“Focus on results, not process” acquisition initiative. 
 Chapter five (Conclusions and Recommendations) summarizes the research 
findings, discusses data collected during interviews and the conclusions reached from that 
data, and provides implementable recommendations.  The chapter also suggests areas for 
future research and study.   
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Impact of Study 
This study will give Air Force leaders clear, implementable metrics that can be 
used as measures of success for the Lightning Bolt initiative of interest.  This study will 
also give Air Force leaders insight into whether or not this initiative is an effective and 
appropriate way to drive the changes it was meant to bring about.  In a broader 
application, the framework used in this study can be used to develop metrics for other 
acquisition based corporate Air Force level initiatives.    
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 This chapter provides the foundation upon which metrics to assess the Lightning 
Bolt 2002 initiative “Focus on results, not process” can be developed.  In turn, the 
research results and metrics can be generalized for any large acquisition based initiative 
and thus fulfill the corporate purpose of the research.  First, this chapter describes the 
background and purpose of the specific initiative being examined along with five others 
that have been developed to facilitate the United States Air Force acquisition 
community’s improvement and transformation efforts.  Next, the chapter reviews the 
importance of metrics and what metrics are; general steps involved in developing metrics; 
attributes of good metrics; and how metrics can be applied to acquisition reform 
initiatives.  It is through this review that commonalities among theories of metric 
development will be used to build a collection of attributes found to be recurrent among 
good metrics.  Then, a list of metrics, generated through a series of interviews, will be 
assessed against the characteristics of good metrics to construct a set of useable metrics 
for the Lightning Bolt 2002 initiative entitled “Focus on results, not process.”  
 
Acquisition Lightning Bolt 2002 Initiatives 
On 27 February 2002, in an update to the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(2002:¶11) on the Air Force’s on-going acquisition reform efforts and progress, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Dr. Marvin Sambur, reaffirmed the 
goal set for the Air Force by the President and the Secretary of Defense to transform the 
military and improve how it does business.  He stated that the Air Force must reduce the 
cycle times for moving new technology from the laboratory to the battlefield.  At the 
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same time, he said that the acquisition community must improve their ability to estimate 
both costs and schedules and greatly reduce the number of program surprises that 
undermine confidence in our programs and disrupt our progress.  Acquisition 
practitioners must increase their delivery speed and regain credibility with the warfighter; 
acquisition practitioners must deliver what they say they are going to deliver when they 
say they are going to deliver it. 
In an effort to address senior leaders’ desire to improve speed and credibility, the 
acquisition leaders released the most recent round of Lightning Bolt initiatives in 2002.  
Similar sets of initiatives have been released in groups of six to ten, approximately every 
two years since 1995.  Two of the six initiatives released in 2002 are process oriented.  
The “Focus on results, not process” initiative encourages streamlining existing 
acquisition processes, challenging those that do not add value, and getting rid of the 
processes that do not make sense; in turn, the initiative allows acquisition practitioners to 
keep their focus on delivering capabilities that meet the needs of warfighters.  The second 
process initiative is designed to strengthen continuing process improvements and 
communication between the government and contractors by creating a knowledge 
pipeline. (Druyun, 2001; Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002)  
The other four 2002 initiatives are people oriented.  The spiral development 
initiative is designed to encourage cooperation between warfighters and acquisition 
practitioners during the development and incremental delivery of warfighting capabilities.  
In other words, it makes the standard way of doing business between the acquisition 
community and warfighters a collaborative effort which looks at the entire capability the 
warfighter needs and incrementally delivers fully functional portions of that capability as 
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funding levels will allow, until the entire capability can be delivered.  The “road-block 
buster” initiative gives managers a single point of contact to help them remove 
administrative and bureaucratic stumbling blocks, thus freeing them to be innovative; the 
Acquisition Centers of Excellence (ACE) were created to be the single point of contact 
specified in this initiative.  The initiative entitled “breeding innovators” targets changing 
the ingrained culture of the acquisition workforce through acquisition reform education.  
Finally, the last initiative sparked the creation of a Program Executive Officer (PEO) for 
service contracts in order to ensure that the Air Force is leveraging its buying power as 
the portion of its money spent on services contracts continues to increase.  Table 1 is a 
summary of the title and objective of each of the 2002 Lightning Bolts.  (Druyun, 2001; 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002) 
 
Table 1.  Summary of 2002 Acquisition Lightning Bolt Initiatives 
 (Consolidated from Druyun, 2001 and Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002) 
2002 Lightning Bolt Initiative Objective 
Focus on results, not 
process 
Drives “clean-sheet” approach to acquisitions by 
streamlining processes in order to remove non value-added 
steps. 
The knowledge pipeline  Creates a “knowledge pipeline” with industry to ensure 
continual communication and process improvements 
among both contractors and the government.   
Spirals:  success in 
increments  
Makes collaborative spiral development the preferred 
acquisition approach and requires collaboration between 
warfighters and the acquisition community.   
Road-block busters Frees managers to innovate and provide managers with a 
focal point to help them remove bureaucratic roadblocks. 
Breeding innovators Strives to refresh, revitalize, and sustain the workforce. 
Program Executive 
Officer (PEO)/Service 
contracts 
Obtains the best possible value out of the rising portion of 
Air Force procurement money spent on service contracts.   
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This research will focus on the Lightning Bolt 2002 initiative most closely linked 
with the corporate goal set for the Air Force to improve speed and credibility:  “Focus on 
results, not process”.  This initiative drives a “clean-sheet” approach to acquisitions by 
streamlining processes in order to remove non value-added steps (Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 2002:¶14).  In other words, the initiative frees up the administrative hands of 
acquisition practitioners to allow them to be as innovative as possible within the confines 
of the law.  A recent example of this initiative in action is the rewriting of one of the 
regulations that governs weapon system procurement within the Air Force, and the rest of 
the Department of Defense (DoD), the DoD 5000 series (i.e., DoD Directive 5000.1, 
DoD Instruction 5000.2, and DoD 5000.2-R).  The DoD 5000 series documents were 
canceled on 30 October 2002 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, then 
interim guidance was issued; the 5000 series documents have subsequently been revised 
(Wolfowitz, 2002).  DoD 5000.1 was reissued (New DoD System Acquisition Process 
(DoD 5000)).  DoD 5000.2 was revised; unlike the old version which focused on multiple 
superfluous requirements, the new version goes in depth into the acquisition model and 
looks specifically at statutory requirements and required outcomes (New DoD System 
Acquisition Process (DoD 5000)).  DoD 5000.2-R is no longer a mandatory document, 
but is serving as the Interim DoD Acquisition Guidebook until the new streamlined DoD 
Acquisition Guidebook is completed; program managers and decision authorities are now 
empowered to decide what kind of information is necessary to satisfy regulatory 
requirements (Defense Acquisition University Presentation; Department of Defense 
(DoD), 2002; New DoD System Acquisition Process (DoD 5000)).   
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With the continued push for acquisition reform and the goal of increased speed 
and credibility, senior Air Force leaders want to know how well the Lightning Bolts are 
actually doing their job.  Currently, no metrics are in place to measure their success.  This 
research will create a framework for building such measures of success by examining 
why metrics are important, what metrics are, the steps involved in creating metrics, the 
characteristics that good metrics should possess, and how metrics can be applied to 
acquisition reform initiatives; the framework will then be applied to a recent initiative 
and suggest metrics for it. 
 
Metrics 
 Why bother to develop metrics in the first place?  Simply put:  to improve 
performance (Antanitus, 2003:10; Buchheim, 2000:309; Rummler and Brache, 
1995:135).  Metrics are frequently dubbed ‘performance measures’, meaning they tap 
how well an organization is performing (Goett, 2003; Klapper, Hamblin, Hutchison, 
Novak, and Vivar, 1999; Lambert and Pohlen, 2001:1; Milliken, 2001).  The ultimate 
goal of metrics should be “performance” not the measures themselves (Milliken, 2001).  
Osborne and Gaebler (1992:147-154) note that:  if the results of that performance are not 
measured, success cannot be differentiated from failure; if that success cannot be seen, it 
cannot be rewarded and failure is likely being rewarded instead; and if failure cannot be 
recognized, it cannot be corrected.  The purpose of performance measures, or metrics, is 
not just to examine how an organization is performing, but to help it perform better 
(Hammer, 2001:109). 
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Metrics are used to improve performance; furthermore, properly structured 
metrics can drive superior performance.  Keebler and others (1999:13) surveyed 355 
retailers, manufacturers, and transportation providers in the United States and conducted 
case studies of roughly two dozen companies, and discovered a great disparity in levels 
of performance.  The singularly most important factor that Keebler and others (1999:13) 
found to be driving superior performance was the presence of well-utilized and properly 
structured measurement programs.  Inadequately structured metrics can drive the wrong 
behaviors and even result in dysfunctional behaviors (Neely, Richards, Mills, Platts, and 
Bourne, 1997).  Even though there has been a high level of interest in metrics within 
industry and academia, and many methods have been suggested to develop metrics, no 
one has addressed what makes up a well-designed metric and no one has compared these 
methods for effectiveness (Neely and others, 1997).  This research proposes that a well-
designed metric is one that is systematically created and one that possesses the attributes 
of good metrics found to be common within the literature.     
Additional evidence of how the use of metrics has been empirically shown to 
improve performance is seen through the implementation of goal setting (see, for 
example, Locke, Shaw, Saari, and Latham (1981:126)).  Metrics are the feedback 
mechanism by which progress toward organizational goals is measured (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 1999:133).  For 
example, as part of a recent policy directive from the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force on improving speed and credibility within the acquisition workforce, the 
Commander’s Initial Guidance section states that the overall goal is to shorten the time it 
takes for decisions and getting more capable weapon systems out to the warfighter by a 
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factor of four (Department of the Air Force, 10 July 2003:3).  Correspondingly, the 
metric to determine if that goal is met will be cycle time.  By virtue of a goal being set, 
metrics can be used; therefore, based on the literature, this research shows that empirical 
evidence supports that the use of metrics improves performance.  
The following examples further support that the implementation of metrics 
increases performance.  The concept of assigning workers a specific task (a term which 
Locke (1982:16) notes is basically the same as a goal), along with incentive pay and time 
and motion study, served as the basis for Frederick W. Taylor’s principles of scientific 
management (Latham and Locke, 1979:69; Taylor, 2001:61-72).  Taylor increased blue 
collar worker productivity through the use of his scientific management system (Taylor, 
2001:64).  Locke (1968:157) later theorized that goal setting is directly tied to task 
performance; he explains that difficult goals result in higher performance than easy goals, 
and that specific, hard goals lead to even higher performance levels compared to 
generalized “do your best” goals or no goals at all.  Latham and Yukl’s (1975:824-843) 
evaluation of Locke’s theory and their meta-analysis of twenty seven published and 
unpublished field research reports consistently found that goal setting produces increased 
performance.  Also, Latham and Locke’s (1979:68-80) laboratory and field research 
showed that the use of goal setting increased production by an average of nineteen 
percent.  In addition, Locke and others’ (1981:125,131) evaluation of one hundred and 
ten laboratory and field studies on goal setting effects on task performance found that 
ninety-nine of those studies showed higher performance resulted from setting specific, 
hard goals than from no, “do your best,” easy, or medium goals.  A significant amount of 
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data attests to the presence of increased performance when goals are set, and, therefore, 
when metrics are used. 
 In addition to metrics’ importance because of improved performance, Keebler, 
Mandrodt, Durtsche, and Ledyard (1999:80-81) point out that measures aid companies in 
determining how to remain competitive and confirm the value customers place on their 
services.  And the underlying truth within the axiom that what gets measured gets 
attention is yet another reason to use metrics (Eccles, 1991:131; Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992:146).  
Now that the importance of metrics has been discussed, a description of what 
constitutes a metric will help facilitate the explanation of this research.  The Metrics 
Handbook developed by Air Force Systems Command (1991:1-1) defines metrics as 
meaningful measures, and data are meaningful when they allow action to be taken.  
Similarly, Antanitus (2003:11) calls metrics items you would like to measure.  Metrics 
emphasize the customer, support organizational objectives and goals, facilitate process 
understanding, and encourage continual improvement of how business is done (AFSC, 
1991:1-1).     
According to Clark and Wheelwright (1994:262), there are two types of measures:  
results measures, which tell a team where it currently stands in its attempt to reach a goal, 
rather than how it got there or what it could do differently; and process measures which 
look at activities and tasks within an organization that produce given results.  Also, 
metrics can be expressed both qualitatively and quantitatively (Beamon, 1999).  
Quantitative metrics are frequently preferred because qualitative metrics, like “poor,” 
“fair,” and “good,” are vague and hard to use in a meaningful way (Beamon, 1999).  
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However, quantitative metrics may not adequately discuss a system’s performance and, 
as a result, may be just as vague (Beamon, 1999).  Locke (1978:600) points out that it 
should not be assumed that specific quantitative goals, and, in turn, metrics, are 
inevitably beneficial.  Some areas where results are more difficult to measure may require 
qualitative goals, and, in turn, qualitative metrics (Locke, 1978:600).  The decision 
between qualitative and quantitative metrics depends upon the nature of the system for 
which the metrics, or goals, are being established.         
  It is worthwhile to note that several concepts have become prevalent within the 
business arena over the last two decades and have popularized, and somewhat 
revolutionized, the use of metrics, namely the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 
March 2001) and benchmarking (Eccles, 1991:131).  Kaplan and Norton (March 2001; 
September 2001) created a way of linking metrics with the elements of an organization’s 
strategy to create a new strategic management system.  Metrics are one component of the 
balanced scorecard.  Benchmarking is information gathering in industry to compare an 
organization’s performance with that of other leading organizations that do the same or 
similar tasks (Camp, 1989:xiii; Eccles, 1991:133).  Metrics are used in benchmarking, but 
are not synonymous with it. 
 Metrics have been utilized in many ways to improve performance and multiple 
methods have been proposed to develop them.  This research looks at several of those 
methods and uses their similarities to propose one generally applicable three step method 
for creating metrics.  
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Steps to Create Metrics. 
By comparing the numerous methods for systematically developing metrics that 
exist within the literature, this research found that nearly all of the methods share three 
common steps which will later be discussed.  Of the literature reviewed, twelve authors 
presented thirteen general frameworks for creating metrics.  The number of steps 
involved in each framework ranged from three steps up to eleven steps.  For example, 
Clark and Wheelwright (1994:272-273) suggest a four step method:  a) define factors 
critical to customer satisfaction; b) map cross-functional process through which results 
are obtained; c) identify capabilities and tasks necessary to complete process 
successfully; and d) design measures to track those capabilities and tasks.  Rummler and 
Brache (1995:137-138) recommend a similar four step sequence:  a) clearly establish the 
most important outputs of the process, job, or organization; b) for each output, establish 
the “critical dimensions” of performance; c) create measures for every critical dimension; 
and d) create standards, or goals, for each measure.  In contrast, Eccles and Pyburn 
(1992) suggest a five step process that does not share the three steps found to be common 
among the other authors:  a) choose non-financial measures that will compliment 
financial measures, determine relationships between them, and the create firm’s business 
performance model; b) establish methodology to be used to take the measures; c) select 
the frequency and layout of performance measurement reports; d) adjust how personnel 
are compensated and evaluated to encourage desired behavioral changes that will 
improve activity performance; and e) realize that a key element of a performance 
measurement system is that it will evolve with time as managers grow and increase their 
knowledge of measures’ relationships to one another and as conditions change.  A 
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complete illustration of the general steps for creating metrics for all twelve authors found 
in the literature is shown in Table 2.     
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Table 2.  General Steps for Creating Metrics within Literature 
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Table 2.  General Steps for Creating Metrics within Literature (continued) 
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Table 2.  General Steps for Creating Metrics within Literature (continued) 
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No empirical evidence was found within the literature to suggest that any one 
particular method was better to use than any other.  One size does not fit all and many 
differences exist among the authors’ approaches, but three basic steps remained common 
among eleven of the thirteen frameworks examined (INCOSE, 1998:9).  First, establish a 
starting point upon which to base the metrics; determine what you want to measure.  
Second, identify the most important elements of what you want to measure.  Third, create 
specific metrics for those critical elements so as to improve the performance of the item 
being measured.  If metrics are created by systematically following these three general 
steps and they possess the attributes of good metrics they will be properly-structured 
metrics and will have the potential to drive superior performance (Keebler and others, 
1999:13). 
Attributes of Good Metrics. 
Certain characteristics distinguish good metrics from bad ones and well-designed 
metrics possess those good characteristics.  Fourteen authors in the literature describe 
forty three distinct attributes that good metrics possess.  The following are a 
representative list of the good metric attributes in the literature.  Beamon (1999) says that 
good metrics have six characteristics:  consistency with organizational goals, 
inclusiveness of pertinent aspects, measurability, meeting of customer goals and values, 
relating to strategic goals and mission of organization, and universality.  In comparison, 
Buchheim (2000:311) describes good metrics as having eight characteristics, only one of 
which is common with those cited by Beamon (i.e, relating to strategic goals and 
mission).  According to Buchheim (2000:311), good metrics:  have a defined sensor that 
gathers and records data, like an automated test station data file or a clerk; have a defined 
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unit of measurement (e.g., hours per widget produced); are meaningful to the customer; 
measure results versus process (e.g., measure the level of skill demonstrated using a 
widget versus the number of days spent attending training sessions); have a regular 
frequency with which reports and measurements are done (e.g., monthly average failure 
rate); are simple to use; and are understandable.  A third source finds that good metrics 
possess three characteristics, only one of which is shared with Beamon’s and Buchheim’s 
attributes; Evans and Lindsay (2002:464,466) agree with both Beamon and Buchheim 
that good metrics relate to the strategic goals and mission of the organization involved, 
but also state that good metrics are actionable and useful.   
Table 3 summarizes the attributes of “good” metrics as described in the literature. 
The elements that are common among the research are illustrated with this presentation.  
Of the works shown in Table 3, six authors claim that metrics should relate to the 
organizational mission and strategic goals, five suggest that simplicity is an important 
quality of metrics, and five state that good metrics are meaningful to customers.  Four 
authors also point out that metrics should be understandable and derivable from 
economically collectible data (i.e., cost effective).  All other attributes in Table 3 are 
common among three authors or less.   
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Table 3.  Common Attributes of Good Metrics 
 
AFSC = Air Force Systems Command 
INCOSE = International Council on Systems Engineering 
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Table 3.  Common Attributes of Good Metrics (continued) 
 
AFSC = Air Force Systems Command 
INCOSE = International Council on Systems Engineering 
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Table 3.  Common Attributes of Good Metrics (continued) 
 
AFSC = Air Force Systems Command 
INCOSE = International Council on Systems Engineering 
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Application of Metrics to Acquisition Reform Initiatives. 
In order to create a framework for developing measures of success for corporate 
level Air Force acquisition initiatives, not only must it be understood how to create well-
structured metrics, but it must be understood how those metrics can be applied to 
acquisition reform initiatives.  Metrics can be used to track the progress of supply chain 
initiatives (Klapper and others, 1999).  The supply chain is made up of all the activities 
relating to the transformation and flow of goods from the point of extraction of raw 
materials, through to the end users (Monczka and others, 2002:4).  The military 
acquisition community manages and oversees the activities involved in the procurement 
of weapon systems, from initial development and procurement, through delivery to the 
warfighters, all the way to the end of a weapon system’s life cycle when it is retired or 
sent to the “bone yard” at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; therefore, a supply 
chain perspective is appropriate for analyzing the weapon system acquisition and 
management process.  Accordingly, metrics can be used to monitor the progress of 
acquisition reform initiatives.    
Metrics appropriate for acquisition reform enable an organization to assess reform 
initiatives’ effectiveness and implementation on both acquisition programs and the 
acquisition reform process itself (Pope, 1997:75-76).  Groups within the DoD have 
proposed various metrics to measure acquisition reform; for instance, Pope (1997:57,75-
77) notes that the Navy was working towards using metrics, such as the average cycle 
time for issuance of requests for proposals, to help gauge the use of some of their 
acquisition reform initiatives.  But most acquisition metrics have been used for individual 
acquisition programs; for example, a specific acquisition program, like a program to buy 
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radios for an aircraft, might employ a metric like schedule variance to measure the 
percentage increase or decrease in the time it takes a contractor to deliver radios bought 
in one month compared to the delivery time of radios bought another month (Pope, 
1997:75-77).  No systematic approach to performance measurement or standardized set 
of metrics for acquisition reform initiatives currently exists (Beamon, 1999; Pope, 
1997:75-77). 
In an effort to address the lack of standardized metrics for acquisition initiatives, 
the Acquisition Reform Benchmarking Group (ARBG) was established by the DoD in 
1996 to help measure progress within the arena of acquisition reform (Pope, 1997:34-35).  
Pope (1997:35) determined that the findings of the ARBG divide metrics into three 
levels:  program, subordinate, and enterprise.  Metrics at their most basic level measure 
elements within individual acquisition programs, or “little ‘a’” acquisitions, as Sambur 
refers to acquisitions at the program level (DiCicco, 2003).  Subordinate metrics measure 
factors that feed into the highest level of metrics, which are enterprise metrics.  Enterprise 
metrics measure the efficiency of overarching or generalizable processes that should be 
measured across the whole Air Force (Pope, 1997:34-35) (i.e., termed “big ‘A’” 
Acquisitions related metrics within this occupational community) (DiCicco, 2003).  
Enterprise metrics include cost, schedule, performance, and training metrics.  The 
acquisition initiative this research focuses on pertains to “big ‘A’” Acquisitions and the 
metrics this research will recommend be used to assess that initiative are enterprise level 
metrics.    
Pope (1997:26) found that metrics can also be categorized by the three types of 
activities that they measure, as defined by the 1995 Process Action Team (PAT) for 
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contract administration reform:  go/no-go, activities, and behavioral changes.  Go/no-go 
metrics show whether or not an activity has taken place.  Activity metrics illustrate how 
extensively an action is occurring.  And behavioral change metrics assess whether actions 
are creating the desired change in behavior or results.  Part of the objective of this 
research is to help determine whether or not the use of the acquisition initiative of interest 
is an effective way to bring about the desired changes in the acquisition practitioners’ 
behavior.  Specifically, the acquisition practitioners who participated in this research 
were queried about whether the initiative of interest was the most effective way to get 
them to take the “clean-sheet” approach to acquisitions that the initiative was meant to 
encourage.  Additionally, part of the metrics recommended by this research will fall 
within the behavioral change category.  Now that a framework for building metrics has 
been established by reviewing metrics’ importance, composition, creative steps, good 
attributes, and application to acquisition reform initiatives, that framework will be 
applied in a case study. 
 
Summary 
Acquisition reform initiatives have been born out of senior Air Force leaders’ 
vision of a faster, better acquisition process and an improved relationship between the 
acquisition community and the warfighters they support.  This research focuses on 
developing metrics for one such initiative.  Many theories exist about what constitutes 
good metrics and what the steps involved in creating metrics are.  A large part of the 
literature review and additional research for this thesis identify those theories and 
examine the commonalities among them.  Using those recurrent elements, a model will 
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be developed for building acquisition metrics.  The literature suggests that the metrics 
from the model should be systematically developed using three general steps:  1) create a 
foundation the metrics will be based upon (i.e., what the metrics are intended to focus on 
and be built from), 2) identify the critical elements that you want to measure, and 3) 
create specific metrics for those critical elements in order to improve the system’s 
performance.  According to the literature, the model’s metrics should also have five 
attributes commonly found among good metrics:  relatedness to the organization’s 
strategic goals and mission, simplicity, meaningfulness to customers, understandability, 
and cost effectiveness (AFSC, 1991:2-1; Antanitus, 2003:11; Beamon, 1999; Brown, 
1996:3-10; Buchheim, 2000:311; Evans and Lindsay, 2002:455,466; Keebler and others, 
1999:118-121; INCOSE, 1998:9; Milliken, 2001; Pinker and others, 1997:193; Rummler 
and Brache, 1995:138).  In addition, the literature indicates that it is preferred for metrics 
to be quantifiable, but that sometimes qualitative metrics more adequately discuss system 
performance; the choice between qualitative and quantitative depends on the nature of the 
subject matter being measured (Beamon, 1999; Locke, 1978:600).  To better understand 
the applications of the model for broad use with any large acquisition initiative, a case 
study will be conducted by applying the model to the 2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt 
initiative “Focus on results, not process.”  Chapter three will discuss, in detail, the 
methodology to be used in this study.   
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III.  Methodology 
 
 The goal of this research is to suggest a model for developing performance 
measures for corporate Air Force level acquisition based initiatives.  Because this 
research is exploratory, it will focus on only one initiative:  the 2002 Lighting Bolt 
initiative “Focus on results, not process.”  To do this, interviews were conducted and the 
interview data were translated into metrics for the initiative.  A qualitative analysis of the 
interview data was also done using a protocol based on those of Carter and Jennings 
(2002:145-179), Creswell (1997:142-146; 2003:196-215), Isabella (1990:7-41), and 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:95,98,196).  A variety of themes and patterns emerged from the 
interview data through the analysis.  Subsequently, the level of success the Lightning 
Bolt initiative is having was also examined.  From those results, metrics are suggested for 
application against the “Focus on results, not process” initiative and for broader, 
generalized use with any large acquisition based initiatives.  A description of the 
interview process is provided below. 
 
Methodological Overview 
Based on the nature of the research question, a qualitative approach was used to 
guide the research project based on the procedures outlined by Creswell (2003:179-215).  
In the current qualitative research effort, data was collected through a series of semi-
structured interviews (Creswell, 2003:210-215).  After the interviews were transcribed, 
the transcriptions were broken down into statements and analyzed for common themes.  
Specifically, the interviews were designed to generate a list of metrics that can be used to 
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measure the Lightning Bolt of interest and determine the extent to which this Lightning 
Bolt is appropriately facilitating desired changes.   
The qualitative study findings are envisioned to be reinforced by future, follow-on 
quantitative research that should support and further validate the qualitative findings, 
while expanding the analysis to a large representative sample.  As part of the future 
quantitative research, these qualitative data will be translated into a questionnaire that can 
be used to evaluate the list of metrics generated and to gather more insight into the 
Lightning Bolt’s appropriateness from a broader audience.  The findings from both 
phases should be integrated as part of future research where the quantitative data will be 
used to reinforce and confirm the qualitative results.  In the subsequent sections, the 
nuances of this methodology are explained.   
Interview Sample. 
 In 2001, Acquisition Centers of Excellence (ACE) were established for the Air 
Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Product Centers, and Air Logistic 
Centers to lead acquisition reform efforts (New Acquisition Center Provides Warfighting 
Capabilities, 2001; Lightning Bolts, 2004).  Part of their duties is to oversee the 
implementation of the Lightning Bolt initiatives.  As a result, the ACE offices have 
helped system program office (SPO) leadership understand and implement the initiatives.  
Therefore, in this research, members at the ACE offices and various system program 
offices (SPOs) within the Air Force’s Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers were 
interviewed.  To further broaden the research sample, individuals holding various 
acquisition related positions within Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command, 
and Air Staff were also interviewed.  Modeling Carter and Jennings (2002:150), the 
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sample interviewed was chosen with the intent of getting a high degree of variation 
among managerial levels, in order to get a higher range or scope of data. 
The ACE personnel were asked to identify interview participants, within the 
SPOs, who have experience with the 2002 Lightning Bolt initiative of interest.  The letter 
requesting ACE office assistance in identifying interview participants is shown in 
Appendix A.  The letter describes the target interview audience as consisting of 40-50 
SPO members evenly distributed among the Product and Logistics Centers, holding 
various levels of managerial responsibility, and having experience using the “Focus on 
results, not process” Lightning Bolt.  The letter also asks the Secretariat of the Air Force 
Acquisition Center of Excellence (SAF/ACE) office to utilize subordinate Center ACEs 
to identify interview subjects within this target audience who would then be contacted to 
participate in this research.  
Of the fourteen Center ACEs queried for assistance by the SAF/ACE, two 
provided contact information for interview participants.  The two respondent Center 
ACEs were from separate locations; participants from Acquisition Category (ACAT) one 
and two programs were identified at one location and from ACAT three programs at the 
other location.  ACAT describes program size and dollar amount and ranges from one, 
being the largest and most expensive programs, to three, being the smallest and least 
expensive.  Six Center ACEs gave negative replies (three of which were initially non-
respondent, but gave negative replies when asked again) and cited several reasons why:  
individuals at their location had no experience with the initiative of interest; they sent a 
message out to SPOs asking for participants and got no replies back; due to the nature of 
the mission at their location (e.g., a test and evaluation organization) they did not use the 
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initiative of interest; they never received the request from the SAF/ACE asking for 
assistance with the research; and since their location was neither a Product nor Logistics 
Center (e.g., a Test Center), they thought the request for research assistance did not apply 
to them.  Some Center ACEs cited more than one reason for their negative replies.  The 
six remaining Center ACEs were completely non-responsive even after being queried a 
second time. 
When the low Center ACE response rate was observed, it was realized that a 
broader interview sample was needed and that individuals with acquisition experience 
from Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command, and Air Staff should be 
included among interview participants.  Additional participants were identified with the 
assistance of the SAF/ACE, through interview participants recommending that other 
specific individuals be contacted for interviews (also referred to as ‘snowball sampling’), 
and through personal contacts of the researcher.  A total of twenty five participants were 
identified and interviewed, but only twenty three interviews were usable; nineteen verbal 
interviews were successfully transcribed, two verbal interview recordings were inaudible 
and subsequently unusable, two interviews were recorded using only notes taken during 
the interviews, and two interviews were conducted via email.    
Interview Correspondence. 
Potential interview participants were identified and then contacted to determine 
their willingness to participate.  Upon their agreement to assist with this research, 
participants were sent a formal invitation letter from the SAF/ACE office.  This letter, 
displayed as Appendix B, explains that the research is designed to help develop metrics 
of success for the Lightning Bolt of interest.  It also explains that any data gathered from 
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the interviews will remain confidential and that participants will not be identifiable.  In 
addition, the letter contains a list of the interview questions.  The interview questions 
were provided prior to conducting the interviews so that participants could prepare, in 
hopes of making the interviews more efficient and effective. 
 After interview candidates were identified and invited to participate, each was 
contacted via email or telephone to schedule an interview time.  Prior to the scheduled 
interviews, each participant was contacted to confirm his or her availability for the 
interview.  Then, the interviews were conducted face-to-face, over the telephone, and 
using email.  Notes were taken during each verbal interview, and interviews were 
recorded and transcribed (with the interviewee’s permission) whenever possible.     
Appendix C is a global appendix of the additional exchanges that took place with 
interview subjects.  A schedule reminder was emailed to participants to reiterate the time 
and date of each interview.  The reminder also acted as a confirmation of participants’ 
availability for the interviews.  Also included in Appendix C is a copy of the interview 
script that was used.  The script addresses the intent of the research to develop metrics for 
the Lightning Bolt of interest, and the assurance that the data collected during the 
interviews will remain confidential.  The interview questions address subjects’ views 
about:  a) the purpose and goals of the “Focus on results, not process” Lightning Bolt 
initiative; b) metrics to be used to measure the successful implementation of the 
initiative; c) their role in the initiative’s implementation; and d) support being received to 
implement the initiative.    
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Interview Method. 
The interviews included open-ended items, allowing participants to go in different 
directions.  However, in this research, a semi-structured interview approach was used in 
order to address the topics of interest about participants’ use of the Lightning Bolt, within 
the interview time constraints.  A semi-structured interview enabled the research to 
follow the standard questions in Appendix C while allowing the latitude to include a few 
tailored questions to probe or clarify a participant’s reasoning.  (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2001:196)    
 Following Carter and Jennings (2002:152) and Leedy and Ormrod (2001:98), face 
validity of the interview questions has been assessed using several methods.  First, the 
questions were reviewed by knowledgeable academicians and acquisition practitioners.  
Based on this expert review, redundant questions were removed; a few questions were 
reworded to prevent leading the participants and to make the questions more objective; 
and a few questions were added based on the reviewers’ suggestions.  Second, after ten 
percent of the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed and reviewed to 
determine whether themes were emerging and if questions were clear to participants; the 
interview questions were refined and adjusted accordingly.  Interviewing is a dynamic 
process, so data was continually analyzed throughout the process and the interview 
questions adjusted as needed.  
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Analysis Technique 
Data Analysis. 
The qualitative data collected was analyzed using Creswell’s (1997:142-146) data 
analysis spiral.  Using this spiral, data was reviewed multiple times while going through 
the following steps: 
1. Organization:  Organize the data using a computer database.  Break large portions 
of text into smaller units (i.e., sentence and individual words). 
2. Perusal:  Peruse the whole data set many times to get the big picture of what it 
contains as a whole.  Write down potential interpretations and categories while 
perusing. 
3. Classification:  Identify recurrent themes and categories, and classify or group 
each datum accordingly.  In this step patterns should begin to emerge. 
4.  Synthesis:  Integrate and summarize the data.  Develop propositions or 
hypotheses that describe categorical relationships.  Create diagrams, tables, 
matrices, etc. to illustrate proposed relationships. 
Validation. 
Creswell (2003:196) suggests eight strategies for validating the accuracy of 
findings, three of which applied to the findings of this research.  The first validation 
strategy employed is to clearly state the biases the researcher brings to the study and 
those that exist due to the nature of the research (Creswell, 2003:196).  The following are 
potential biases.  First, the self-reporting nature of interviews makes them inherently 
biased.  Second, the interviews only look at a snapshot in time in terms of the 
participants’ responses, meaning the data are transient in nature, so interview responses 
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may be different at different points in time (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:95).  Third, there 
could be a possible sample bias because participants are not being selected randomly.  
However, follow-on research could counter this bias by randomly selecting a sample that 
represents the population of Air Force acquisition practitioners.   
 Peer debriefing is the second strategy to validate the findings of this research.  
Experienced acquisition practitioners who are familiar with this area of research reviewed 
and asked questions about the qualitative portions of the research.  This was done to help 
ensure the accuracy of the findings and to make the explanation of this research clearer 
for an outside audience (i.e., readers other than the researcher).  (Creswell, 2003:196) 
 Following Isabella (1990:13) and utilizing Creswell’s (2003:196) third strategy, 
external auditors were used to review the entire research project.  As part of the 
qualitative data analysis, recurrent themes were identified and interview data categorized 
accordingly.  Non-acquisition and acquisition professionals who were new to the research 
project were given a list of statements from the interviews and a list of the themes that 
emerged.  These individuals were then asked to categorize the interview statements under 
the themes they thought were appropriate matches.  The purpose of this was to see if the 
external auditors found that the same interview statements represent the themes as 
intended.  The independent categorization provided by the auditors validates the 
classification and synthesis of the data.  The external auditors assessed the project at the 
conclusion of the research process.  
 The qualitative analysis of the interview data, combined with the steps to create 
metrics and characteristics of good metrics that were revealed through the literature, 
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enable the building of metrics for the initiative of interest.  The following sections 
describe what was gleaned from the literature. 
 
Literature Findings   
 The literature reviewed for this research was used to identify a set of three 
generalized steps for creating metrics and a comprehensive list of desirable qualities for 
metrics.  Table 2 and Table 3 (previously shown in chapter two) illustrate the way these 
steps and attributes were captured, respectively, the matrices of steps and attributes, and 
the authors who have identified the various steps and attributes. 
 Consolidation of Steps for Creating Metrics. 
 Methods for creating metrics suggested by multiple authors in the literature were 
compared to one another and searched for common elements.  Similarities between the 
methods were merged into one generalized three step process for creating metrics.  The 
three step method includes:  1) decide what is to be measured, 2) identify the critical 
aspects of the item to be measured, and 3) create specific metrics for each critical aspect 
in order to improve performance.  The metrics suggested by this research will not only be 
developed using this systematic process, they will embody the attributes of good metrics. 
Attribute Identification. 
 
After all the literature was reviewed, the list of attributes identified was funneled 
down into a core set of five common attributes to eliminate redundancy.  Attributes 
agreed upon by four or more authors are included in the core set.  Those attributes 
include:  relatedness to the organization’s strategic goals and mission, simplicity, 
meaningfulness to customers, understandability, and cost effectiveness (AFSC, 1991:2-1; 
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Antanitus, 2003:11; Beamon, 1999; Brown, 1996:3-10; Buchheim, 2000:311; Evans and 
Lindsay, 2002:455,466; Keebler and others, 1999:118-121; INCOSE, 1998:9; Milliken, 
2001; Pinker and others, 1997:193; Rummler and Brache, 1995:138). 
Core Attributes.  
The first dimension of good metrics to be measured is that they relate to the 
strategic goals and mission of the organization involved (Antanitus, 2003:11; Beamon, 
1999; Buchheim, 2000:311; Evans and Lindsay, 2002:455; Milliken, 2001; Pinker and 
others, 1997:191).  This relationship is important so the organization can determine if it is 
meeting its strategic goals, and so people within the organization will focus on what is 
being measured, thereby steering the direction of the organization (Beamon, 1999).   
The second dimension is that the metric must be meaningful to the customer 
(AFSC, 1991:2-1; Brown, 1996:6; Buchheim, 2000:311; Pinker and others, 1997:193; 
Rummler and Brache, 1995:138).  A metric is meaningful when it is something the 
customer cares about (Buchheim, 2000:311).  And it must present data that enables action 
to be taken (AFSC, 1991:1-1).   
The third dimension of good metrics is simplicity (AFSC, 1991:2-1; Buchheim, 
2000:311; INCOSE, 1998:9; Pinker and others, 1997:193).  Simplicity means that the 
metric must be as simple and logical as possible, so it will be easy to collect, analyze, and 
understand (INCOSE, 1998:9). 
The fourth dimension good metrics need is that they must be derivable from 
economically collectible data (AFSC, 1991:2-1; INCOSE, 1998:9; Keebler and others, 
1999:119-121; Pinker and others, 1997:193).  An organization must decide if it is cost 
effective to collect data for each metric.  The organization has to determine if they can or 
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cannot afford to collect the data, and if the data offers greater value than it costs 
(INCOSE, 1998:9). 
The fifth dimension is that good metrics must be understandable (AFSC, 1991:2-
1; Buchheim, 2000:311; Keebler and others, 1999:119; Pinker and others, 1997:193).  
When a metric can convey, with just a cursory level look, how it was derived and what 
exactly it is measuring then, Keebler and others (1999:119) say, it is easy to understand. 
Now that the five core attributes have been defined, the data gathered from the 
interviews can be analyzed and metrics for the initiative of interest developed by using 
the three general steps for creating metrics and ensuring that the created metrics possess 
the good attributes. 
 
Summary  
A qualitative method approach has been used to conduct this research project.  
Data from the qualitative analysis was applied to the information gathered from the 
literature about the steps involved in creating metrics and the characteristics that good 
metrics are supposed to have, in order to develop metrics for the “Focus on results, not 
process” Lightning Bolt initiative.  These four elements together, meaning the data from 
interview participants, the steps to creating metrics, the good attributes, and the initiative 
of interest used as a case study, build the framework for developing research based 
metrics for any large acquisition based program.     
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IV.  Data Analysis 
 
 The focus of this effort is to create a framework for developing measures of 
success for corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives.  A four part framework has 
been suggested.  Through the review of literature, common steps for creating metrics 
were established and recurrent characteristics of good metrics were identified.  Then 
interviews were conducted with acquisition practitioners who have experience with the 
initiative of interest.  Finally, those three parts will be applied to the “Focus on results, 
not process” Lighting Bolt initiative as a case study and metrics for the initiative will be 
suggested as a result.  This chapter discusses data collected during the interviews and the 
subsequent analysis.  Multiple patterns and themes were discovered during the qualitative 
analysis of the data.  Chapter five will discuss the conclusions drawn from the analysis 
and recommend the implementation of several related activities.  The following sections 
describe the data.   
 
Interview Participants 
 Interviews were conducted with Air Force officers and Air Force government 
civilians from Air Combat Command, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Space 
Command, and the Air Staff.  Individuals ranged in rank from GS-12s to Senior 
Executive Service (SES) members and General Officers.  Participants held a variety of 
positions from System Program Office (SPO) level program managers, contracting 
officers, and division chiefs, to Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Center 
Commanders, to Secretary of the Air Force staff level positions (i.e., Assistant Secretary 
of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) related positions).  Their time in federal 
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service ranged from five years up to thirty one years.  The high degree of variety in 
participants’ managerial levels and areas of expertise provided a high range or scope of 
data (Carter and Jennings, 2002:150). 
For purposes of maintaining participant confidentiality, GM-15s, GS-15s, and 
Senior Executive Service members (excluding those within the Air Staff), and System 
Program Directors, Program Executive Officers (PEOs), and Center Commanders who 
participated in this research will be categorized as “middle management.”  Interview 
participants referred to this grouping of people as middle management, to Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force equivalent positions and above as “senior leadership,” and to 
Deputy System Program Director equivalent positions and below as “SPO level 
workers.”  Note that most middle managers, and some workers, are actually relatively 
senior, experienced personnel; the categories are essentially a self-classification by the 
participants of their positions relative to other participants’ positions.   
 
Analysis Overview 
Modeling Isabella (1990:13), when the data collection was completed, interview 
participants’ responses to each interview question were systematically and carefully 
examined to identify both recurrent and unique themes.  Every interview transcript was 
reviewed and sections of the interviews were excerpted verbatim and typed on separate 
pieces of paper to illustrate the nucleus of each individual’s statements (Isabella, 
1990:13).  After excerpts were perused, as part of Creswell’s (2003:142-146) data 
analysis spiral, they were classified into recurrent themes and categories.  Isabella 
(1990:13) refers to this as coding into final categories.  Roughly seven hundred excerpts 
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were recorded.  Category coding accuracy was ensured using external auditors (Creswell, 
2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13).  Representative examples of data (i.e., interview excerpts) 
were given to independent reviewers, or external auditors, including acquisition 
practitioners and non-acquisition practitioners new to the research project (Creswell, 
2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13).  The reviewers were then trained in the rationale used for 
coding excerpts into categories (Creswell, 2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13).  Due to the large 
number of total interview excerpts, reviewers were given a limited number of excerpts to 
code.  In one such instance, reviewers were asked to code seventy eight excerpts about 
what metrics should be used for the initiative of interest and they classified fifty six 
excerpts into the same categories as the researcher, giving a seventy two percent level of 
agreement (Creswell, 2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13).  Reviewers’ results provided 
reasonable verification of coding procedure accuracy (Creswell, 2003:196; Isabella, 
1990:13).  The patterns and themes revealed through this coding are described below in 
greater detail for each interview question.  As the focus of this research is developing 
measures of success for acquisition initiatives, the themes and patterns that emerged from 
the interview questions directly pertaining to metrics for the initiative of interest will be 
addressed first and the findings from the remaining interview questions discussed 
thereafter. 
Suggested Metrics to Measure the Success of “Focus on results, not process” 
Initiative Implementation. 
Two interview questions directly addressed metrics for the initiative of interest.  
Interview participants were asked what metrics they would use to measure the results the 
initiative was meant to bring about, and then later in the interview participants were 
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asked how they would know if they were succeeding at implementing the initiative.  Out 
of participants’ responses, five main categories of metrics were recurrent:  schedule, 
customer satisfaction, cost, performance, and credibility.   
The theme most identified by participants was schedule.  Schedule, also called an 
acquisition program baseline, refers to the lengths of time a program has set to 
accomplish various tasks.  Based on participant responses, the category of schedule also 
includes a sub-category of cycle time, meaning the length of time from identifying a need 
for something until it is delivered.  One way to classify cycle time is by whether it is 
oriented around capability or around documentation.  Capability based cycle time refers 
to the amount of time between the warfighter stating his need for a new capability (e.g., 
being able to detect enemy troop movements within buildings) and that capability is 
being delivered (e.g., an infrared sensor is installed on an aircraft).  Documentation based 
cycle time refers to acquisition lead-time or the time it takes to complete a document 
related activity (e.g., the time it takes for a contract to be negotiated until the legal 
document is signed by the parties and processed out).  This theme is directly related to 
Sambur’s (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002:¶11) call for improved speed; the 
acquisition community has to deliver things when they say they are going to deliver 
them.  Seventy four percent of participants identified schedule as a metric category for 
the initiative of interest. 
Customer satisfaction with the product, process, or service being provided was the 
second most frequently named metric category.  In the participants’ view, customer 
satisfaction also encompasses a sub-category of expectation management.  A large part of 
how satisfied the customer is depends on whether they received what they were 
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expecting.  Sixty one percent of participants named customer satisfaction as a metric 
category. 
Cost was the third most identified theme.  This theme is self explanatory; it deals 
with activities related to money.  This theme occurred among thirty nine percent of 
participants.     
Performance was the fourth most recurring theme for these interview questions.  
It refers to how well or how poorly a product, process, or program is performing 
compared to program specifications and customer expectations.  Both customer 
satisfaction and performance address expectations; of the two, performance is the more 
direct comparison against expected capability, and customer satisfaction addresses a 
more comprehensive assessment of all customer expectations.  Twenty six percent of 
participants suggested metrics that fit into this category. 
Credibility was the fifth category of participant interview responses.  Credibility 
for the acquisition workforce would mean that their customers, mainly the warfighters, 
would believe what they tell them and find them trustworthy.  This also ties in with 
Sambur’s (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002:¶11) call to improve credibility; the 
acquisition community has to deliver what they say they are going to deliver.  However, 
the occurrence of this theme among only seventeen percent of participants does not seem 
to support Sambur’s push for improved credibility; this indicates that not many people 
see measuring credibility as a way of telling if this initiative is succeeding.  In contrast, 
the frequent recurrence of schedule among seventy four percent of participants does offer 
support for Sambur’s call for speed.   
 
 44
The remaining interview excerpts for these questions that did not seem to fit into a 
particular category were placed in a miscellaneous category.  Following Isabella’s 
(1990:13-22) example, Table 4 displays representative excerpts from responses to the 
interview question “What metrics would you use to measure those results or outcomes?” 
and illustrates how responses flowed across each of the five categories described above.  
Table 5 displays the same information as Table 4 for to the second specific metrics 
related question of “How would you know if you are succeeding at implementing the 
initiative?”.   
The rest of the chapter discusses themes that emerged from answers to the 
remaining fifteen interview questions.  These additional questions pertain to areas of 
supplemental interest to the sponsor of this research project, and some are related to the 
development of generic acquisition initiatives.  The conclusions and recommendations 
reached from the data analysis will be discussed later.     
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Table 4.  Interview Excerpt Categorization for Suggested Initiative Metrics 
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Table 5.  Interview Excerpt Categorization for                                                     
Measuring Initiative Implementation Success 
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Meaning of 2002 Lighting Bolt “Focus on results, not process” Initiative. 
 Interview participants were asked what they thought the initiative of interest 
meant.  Interview participants included individuals who helped to draft the initiative, one 
of whom stated the following about what the initiative was intended to mean: 
Too many people within the acquisition community focus on completing 
processes (reports, assessments, checklists, etc).  The Lighting Bolt aimed to 
cause people to look at the result intended by the process and to make a judgment 
of whether the activity planned actually furthers the opportunity for success.  
Success isn’t getting through the process – its delivering a needed capability to 
the warfighter!   
 
A variety of responses were provided by participants and then grouped by the themes that 
emerged.  The main themes that emerged are listed below in order of how frequently they 
occurred, from highest to lowest.  For several interview questions, some excerpts applied 
to more than one category or theme (see, for example, excerpts within the categories of 
Table 4 and Table 5).  And when relevant and necessary for clarity, more than one 
excerpt was selected from a participant in order to capture the nucleus of their response 
and in order to reflect how adamantly they responded to the interview question (i.e., they 
stated their response to an interview question multiple times, with differing explanatory 
nuances in each response); this explains why excerpt frequency counts are higher than the 
number of participants in several of the following sections.  For example, the first theme 
that arose for this interview question was from ten excerpts shared among ten 
participants, while the second theme came out of nine excerpts from eight participants, 
and the other themes occurred among four participants or less.  Appendix D summarizes 
descriptive statistics for each theme.   
• Focus on the end customer not the acquisition process itself; support the 
customer  
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• Does what we are doing make sense and does it add value?  If not, get rid of it 
or waive it; remove the unnecessary steps  
• Freeing people up  
• Focus on getting the product out; effects based or outcome based acquisitions 
• Want results not just process 
• Clean-sheet approach 
• The initiative has little meaning and little use 
• Sets the stage for spiral acquisition and evolutionary acquisition 
• Risk management 
• Process must serve results 
• Changing people’s mindset to look at what they can do versus what they 
cannot 
 
Desired Results or Outcomes of Initiative. 
Next, participants were asked what they thought were the desired outcomes or 
results that the initiative was trying to accomplish.  Multiple themes were identified from 
the interview data, the first of which occurred within eleven excerpts among nine 
respondents, the second from ten excerpts between eight respondents, and the remainder 
from five excerpts among four respondents or less.  The following are the themes for this 
question in order of frequency.  Included in Appendix D is a summary of descriptive 
statistics for each theme.   
• Support the Agile Acquisition strategy; provide capability in a timely way 
without getting bogged down in the processes 
• Change people’s way of thinking; be creative, innovative, and use common 
sense 
• Get people to think about the outcome not the how 
• Promises made, promises kept  
• Roadblocks exist to accomplishing initiative outcomes from 1) middle 
management, 2) SAF/AQ staff and other services, and 3) contracting 
• Unchain the process and make bureaucrats look at the big picture 
• Goals are unclear 
• Challenge decision makers when necessary; risk management 
• Freeing up the workforce, empowering them 
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Appropriateness of Initiative Goals. 
Participants were also asked if they thought the goals of the initiative were 
appropriate.  One of the authors of the initiative described the goals, or outcomes, of the 
initiative in the following way: 
… it's from Secretary Roche, General Jumper, Dr. Sambur and at the time, 
General Lyles, Materiel Command Commander, all endorsed the speed and 
credibility as the two primary outcomes that they wanted from this -- from the 
work force and the acquisition system and it was this Focus on Results, Not 
Process Lightning Bolt which attempted to write a policy on how we do business 
that -- that does that.  The outcome is the result itself, not the process.   
 
Based on their understanding of what they thought the goals or outcomes of the initiative 
to be, twenty of the twenty three participants stated that they felt the goals were 
appropriate.  However, when asked if they felt using this initiative was the most 
appropriate way to accomplish the goals that it was meant to accomplish, several 
participants offered various criticisms of the initiative.  A few of those criticisms are 
listed below. 
One middle management participant said: 
 
… Well, they posted these lightning bolts, but they didn’t give me background 
behind them.  I mean, what is the motive for this?  Sometimes just because you 
put something out, clear, in black and white print, unless you know what the 
under-pinning motive is behind it, everyone will enact upon it differently. 
 
Another middle management participant stated: 
 
… At the time of the Lightning Bolts - as long as Mrs. Druyun was the champion, 
you could roll over the bureaucracy.  When she wasn’t, there wasn’t any 
institutional memory to show why or how you could have waived things… 
 
And one SPO level worker remarked: 
 
… It's got to be more than just saying, you know, this is a Lightning Bolt and we 
want everybody to follow it….  It has to be a top down mindset change, you 
know.  It has to have the support of the senior leaders.  It has to be harped on over 
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and over and over again, this is the sorts of things that we're trying to do…  And 
you can't just leave it for the -- the actual day-to-day employee to overcome the 
inertia of things the way they've always done it...  And there's a couple reasons for 
that.  One, it's just inertia.  Two, it's because people are afraid of getting squashed 
if they do something and it doesn't work…  One of the things that -- that we have 
to be real careful about is -- is punishing failures because you can't come up with 
new things unless you try things and fail from time to time.   
   
Most Important Aspects of the Initiative. 
 The interview participants were then asked what they considered to be the most 
important aspects of the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.  Four main themes 
were identified within the data and were close in frequency of occurrence among 
participants.  Organizational culture was the most recurring theme; nine excerpts from six 
participants reflected this theme.  Participants stated that an entrepreneurial mindset was 
the next most important aspect which includes, but is not limited to, becoming creative, 
not being risk averse, taking bold steps to challenge the status quo, and thinking 
differently.  Seven interview excerpts among seven participants noted this aspect.  
Responsiveness to the customer was the next most frequently seen theme with six 
excerpts among five participants.  Lastly, five excerpts from four participants shared the 
theme of communication.  Appendix D includes summary descriptive statistics for each 
theme.   
How Participants Heard about the Initiative. 
 Next participants were asked how they had actually heard of the initiative.  Four 
participants said that they had not heard of the “Focus on results, not process” concept as 
a formal initiative until they were contacted about this research project; but, based on 
their interview responses they had actually already been carrying out the intent of the 
initiative within their jobs.  Those participants included two SPO program managers, a 
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Deputy SPO Director, and an Air Staff member.  Among those participants who had 
heard of the initiative, the sources from which they learned of the initiative were varied.  
The most frequent source of introduction to the initiative was through participants’ chains 
of command and normal information distribution channels; seven excerpts from seven 
participants shared this theme.  The next most recurring theme was direct involvement 
with Druyun, the originator of the initiative.  Six excerpts from five participants shared 
this theme.  Three excerpts from three participants noted direct contributions to writing 
the initiative.  And the three remaining themes observed from single excerpts among 
individual participants were acquisition reform training, Sambur’s (Department of the Air 
Force, 4 February 2003) letter to the acquisition community introducing the initiative as 
part of the new push for improved speed and credibility, and working in an Acquisition 
Center of Excellence (ACE) office.  Appendix D summarizes the descriptive statistics.   
Next Step in “Focusing on Results”. 
 In addition to being asked to explain how they had heard about the initiative, 
participants were asked what the next step should be in order to get the acquisition 
community to actually implement the objectives of the initiative and really focus on the 
results.  There were as many responses to this question as there were interview 
participants.  The most frequent theme within the interview responses for this question 
was seen within six excerpts shared among four participants.  The second most frequent 
theme came from six excerpts among three participants.  The next two most frequent 
themes were seen in three excerpts from three participants.  All of the other themes were 
shared by only two participants or less.  Those themes, summarized in Appendix D, are 
as follows: 
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• Change the acquisition workforce culture 
• Apply the initiative to the processes that support Evolutionary Acquisition 
• Training and education 
• Expectation management with the warfighters and Air Staff, and in turn 
Congress 
• Stop smacking people’s hands for doing acquisitions differently than it has 
always been done 
• Corporate buy-in across oversight organizations within the Air Force and the 
Department of Defense 
• Senior Air Force leadership buy-in 
• Provide examples of specific success stories 
• Road shows 
• Be specific about what constitutes “results” 
• Move people from oversight to execution roles 
• Take people out of the approval chain who are not in the decision chain 
• Bust roadblocks 
• Improve filtering down of initiatives; initiatives lose a lot of punch by the time 
they get to the SPO level workers 
• Release a new set of initiatives on a more practical and specific level 
• Obtain feedback from the troops 
• Look at how we make acquisitions work in the future 
• Include demonstration of initiative implementation as part of appraisals 
• Send out messages about when programs and people failed, but were still 
rewarded for trying and being innovative 
• Set a standard or cut-off point where failing programs are turned off 
• Get people willing to take risks 
• Obtain buy-in from functional and operational communities 
• Follow through 
 
Organization Implementation of the Initiative. 
 After stating what they thought would be the next steps to take in order to get 
people to accomplish the goals of the initiative, participants were asked how their 
organizations were implementing the initiative.  The themes from the data describing 
organizational use of the initiative are listed below.  The most frequent theme 
incorporates seven excerpts from five participants who are members of various 
Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) offices; the second most frequent theme was 
from seven excerpts among three participants; and the third most frequently occurring 
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theme was shared by four excerpts from four participants.  Most of the themes that 
emerged were only common among one or two participants.  See Appendix D for a 
summary of descriptive statistics for each theme. 
• ACE offices assist programs to challenge burdensome processes and try to 
influence people to use the philosophy of the initiative 
• Stress full participation of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) and ensure IPTs 
include the warfighters, contractors, and contracting officers 
• Rewrote Air Force Instructions and Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplements and other guiding documents to free up people 
• Negative replies about not using the initiative 
• Opportunity management; being proactive versus reactive, being creative, and 
using risk management 
• Challenged SPO members to use common sense, and then if it is not the law 
and does not make sense to break it 
• Ensured Requests for Proposals and proposals are outcome based 
• Developed and implemented training on using the initiative 
• Applied initiative as appropriate to SPO programs 
• Used internal teamwork to change SPO mindset from no unless you can prove 
yes, to yes until a roadblock is found that says it cannot be done 
• Empowered SPO program leads, lessened emphasis on functional leads; 
removed non value-added parts of the chain of command 
 
Most participants indicated they were implementing the initiative in some way, 
but several said they were not.  Most notably, several middle management participants 
said they were not actively implementing the initiative because from their perspectives 
Air Force Materiel Command is now more process oriented than product oriented.  They 
are even being sent to lecture series and workshops by Michael Hammer on how to 
specifically use and reengineer processes with the idea, as some participants noted, that 
by so doing they will later be able to focus on the results.  Hammer is a New York Times 
bestselling author, credited with creating the concepts of reengineering and process 
enterprise (Hammer, 2001:i).  Another participant stated that they would not remove non 
value-added acquisition processes because they would not challenge the Federal 
 
 54
Acquisition Regulation without a lawyer.  And one other participant said they were 
having difficulty implementing the initiative. 
Participants’ Roles in the Development or Implementation of the Initiative. 
 Not only were participants asked how their organizations were implementing the 
initiative, each participant was asked what his or her specific role was in either the 
development or implementation of the initiative.  The most recurring theme was that 
participants acted as enablers for their teams.  Those enabling activities included but were 
not limited to the following:  challenging their teams to use the initiative; running 
interference for their teams when their attempts to implement the initiative met 
resistance; massaging relationships (i.e., developing and maintaining a good working 
relationship) with people involved with the acquisition processes to which they were 
trying to apply the initiative and making sure things were running smoothly.  The theme 
of being an enabler was formed from fourteen excerpts among eight participants.  All 
other themes came from three excerpts from three participants or less.  The themes, also 
summarized in Appendix D, are listed below. 
• Being an enabler for your team 
• Developer or author of the initiative 
• Endorser and advocate of the initiative 
• Had no role in the development of the initiative 
• Provide advice to senior leadership on ways to implement the initiative 
• Helped rewrite policies as a result of using the initiative 
• Provided training for SPOs on how to use the initiative 
• Managed customer expectations 
• Architect for implementation of the initiative within a SPO 
 
Support for Organizational Implementation of Initiative. 
 After participants were asked about their roles in the development and 
implementation of the initiative, they were asked several questions about the level of 
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support they are receiving in their attempts to implement the initiative.  The first of these 
questions asked what kind of support participants’ organizations were getting as they try 
to use the initiative.  The most recurring theme that was seen in responses to this question 
came from eighteen excerpts given by thirteen participants.  The other themes were 
expressed in three excerpts among three participants or less.  The themes about types of 
organizational support are listed below in descending order of frequency of occurrence. 
• Top down support 
• ACE help in planning for program events 
• Contractor support 
• Initiative training; risk management training and Discovery Map training 
• Being left alone and trusted to go implement the initiative is the best support 
• Internal support 
• Congressional language can be a big supporter 
 
However, several negative themes about the level of support organizations were receiving 
arose from the responses of seven participants.  
• No support is being given 
• The bureaucracy is fighting implementation of the initiative 
• Senior leaders empowered the workforce to go out and implement the 
initiative, but they are not preaching it enough themselves; need strong, 
consistent advocacy 
• Headquarters puts the initiatives out but does not have to live with them 
Appendix D summarizes both the positive and negative themes raised in responses to this 
question. 
Support for Individual Implementation of Initiative. 
 
 The next support related question dealt with whether or not they felt they were 
getting the support they needed to implement the initiative.  Over sixty five percent of the 
participants said they were receiving the support they needed to implement the initiative 
from those within their chain of command and from those areas within their control.  
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However, thirty percent of participants said they were not getting the support they needed 
from those who are outside of their chain of command but can still influence their ability 
to implement the initiative.  Five percent of participants were undecided.  Participants 
noted that they were not getting support from Headquarters Air Force (HQ USAF), Air 
Staff, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  They cited the need to have a constant 
push from senior Air Force leaders in order to implement the initiative.  For example, one 
participant said: 
… where I don't have the support is the stuff that the senior people need to do, 
they aren't doing enough.  I mean, they -- they just -- they -- they're distracted by 
day to day tactical problems of running the Air Force to the point where -- where 
if they have some time, they'll do transformation stuff, but they -- I -- I just get the 
sense that they don't get that without them involved on a -- on a almost daily 
basis, the -- the -- the forces against change just are so strong that they'll -- they 
figure they can wait it out. 
 
While another participant noted what senior leaders could ideally do to provide support: 
 
… in my ideal world, Chief of Staff of the Air Force would -- would, you know, 
come out and once a month, he'd have some speech on why performance based 
contracting or results based acquisition is critical to the success of the Air Force.  
And every time an issue came up that dealt with contractors or acquisition, we'd 
have a consistent message on that. 
 
The need for consistent, repeatedly vocal support from senior Air Force leaders and the 
need for buy-in from people and processes outside of the immediate Air Force chain of 
command that can still heavily impact people’s successful implementation of the 
initiative continue to be recurring themes. 
Organizational Support for Individual Implementation of Initiative. 
 Participants were also asked how their organizations were supporting them in 
their attempts to put the initiative into action.  The theme of support and encouragement 
being provided by leadership within participants’ direct chains of command was noted 
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among twelve excerpts from eleven out of twenty three participants.  Three other 
participants, including two middle management members, said they received support 
from their organizations by being trusted to do the job and being left alone to do it.  Three 
excerpts from one participant called out strong support from the ACE offices as an 
avenue of organizational support.  Another participant said they were getting support 
from their organization by virtue of having no kick-back from SPO members which 
indicated that the SPO members have accepted the challenge for their organization to 
implement the initiative.  The final theme that arose out of excerpts for this question was 
from a participant who twice stated that they were not seeing leaders at the Senior 
Executive Service (SES) and General Officer level engage enough in the drive to use this 
initiative; the participant considers leaders’ involvement to be one of the most important 
tools they need to do their job.  See Appendix D for a summary of descriptive statistics 
for each theme. 
Initiative Implementation Success Stories. 
 After participants were asked about the level of support they were receiving in 
their attempts to utilize the initiative, they were asked if they had heard of any success 
stories or failures at using the initiative.  Ten of the twenty three participants said they 
could cite no specific examples of success stories, but eleven other participants did 
provide examples of what they considered to be successes.  The success stories were 
grouped into two categories:  process level successes and program level successes.   
 Process level successes are examples of ways the initiative of interest has been 
used to remove non value-added processes and which can be repeated within program 
offices across the entire Air Force.  One such example, as noted by one participant, was 
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the addition of a source selection plan into a System Acquisition Management Plan in 
order to get approval for both at the same time.  Another participant discussed the 
incorporation of a Price Competition Memo (PCM) in a Proposal Analysis Report (PAR) 
which reduced time because now the same pricing structure can be used for both the PAR 
and PCM.   
In another process level success story, a participant was trying to purchase 
desktop computers and related software to be used in an Air Force office and was told 
through their contracting approval chain that the base lawyers said a Mission Need 
Statement (MNS) and Operational Requirements Document (ORD) would be needed due 
to the dollar threshold of the computer purchase.  The participant’s office challenged the 
requirement for the MNS and ORD because it did not make sense since the purchase was 
just for office computers.  Their challenge was successful and the requirement for the 
MNS and ORD was done away with.  That challenge process took about three days and 
saved them six months of work had they been required to do the MNS and ORD. 
Another example of putting the initiative to work involved a reduction in training 
approval time.  An office was taking thirty to forty days to get training classes for their 
acquisition workforce.  The process was examined and it was discovered that training 
notifications were being held up significantly by base training officers who were not 
directly involved in approving the training, but who merely wanted feedback to track who 
was going to training.  As a result, the process was changed by removing the non value-
added steps and base training officers now get feedback on people who attend training on 
the back end (i.e., after the approvals have been made they receive computerized tracking 
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information at the same time people are notified of their training approval), and training 
notifications are computerized and now have a twenty four hour turnaround. 
Additionally, a participant stated that the delegation of contract approval authority 
down to various base level personnel, so that people now rarely have to go through the 
headquarters for contracting (i.e., SAF/AQ and SAF/AQC), is also an initiative 
implementation success story.  Non value-added steps were removed and people not 
essential to the approval process were removed from the decision chain of command.   
 In addition to process level success stories, several weapon system programs were 
recognized by participants as examples of how the initiative can be utilized successfully.  
One such program is the Crystal Modification Program.  The organization running that 
program was able to go and influence the Army and Navy to combine functionalities of 
boxes where it made sense to do so and reduce the footprint, and, in turn, reduce the 
development costs and infrastructure costs.  The focus remained on the product and non 
value-added steps were eliminated.  According to participants, reducing the footprint of 
the cryptographic systems required across the Department of Defense (DoD) is a success 
story that saves the DoD money and gets capabilities met more effectively and more 
efficiently. 
 Several other programs were also identified as success stories because of how 
they kept their focus on the results being delivered to the warfighters and how they did 
not get bogged down in the acquisition process itself.  Programs like Global Hawk, Micro 
Impulse Radar, Patient Support Pallet, and the weaponization of Predator are additional 
examples that participants considered success stories of how the initiative of interest can 
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be used.  However, one final program was considered to be a story both of success and of 
failure, namely the ChemSentry Chemical Detector program.   
 One hundred ChemSentry Chemical Detectors were purchased as Commercial-
Off-the-Shelf equipment in January 2003.  According to participants, this buy was made 
to support warfighters in Operation Iraqi Freedom and was called the “best of agile 
acquisition” by the Aeronautical Systems Center Acquisition Executive.  Many of the 
traditional contracting processes and testing procedures were streamlined to get the 
product out to the field quickly.  The chemical detectors put out in the field were not 
completely tested, but they were fielded very quickly to meet an urgent need and they did 
give some level of protection (better than essentially no protection at all).  Several 
interview participants considered this to be a success story in the sense that the program 
was able to get an increased level of protection in the hands of the warfighters out in the 
field.  Prior to fielding the detectors, troops were using chickens to detect chemical and 
biological warfare; during air attacks chickens were put outside to see if they died or not 
to tell troops if a deadly agent was present.  This was one more example of a program 
level success story of initiative implementation.  In contrast, the follow-on ChemSentry 
buy was considered to be a failure at using the initiative. 
Initiative Implementation Failures. 
 Forty three percent of interview participants indicated that they had not heard of 
any specific examples of failure at using the initiative, though several did identify 
program level and process level failures.  As noted above, however, some participants 
said the ChemSentry program failed in its attempts to use the initiative during the follow-
on buy of one hundred additional chemical detectors when agencies outside of the Air 
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Force became involved.  When the Army, who managed the chemical detectors 
previously used by the Air Force, became aware of the new ChemSentry purchase and 
fielding they performed an independent assessment of available chemical detectors and 
recommended that the old type of chemical detector be used to fill the Air Force 
requirements instead.  Due to the Army’s involvement, and subsequently that of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), additional testing of the detectors was 
required, the program was forced to go through the burdensome and lengthy steps of the 
traditional acquisitions process, and leadership became risk averse and did not support 
the use of the initiative.  The participants said the program is now likely to be 
discontinued.  
 In addition to the ChemSentry Chemical Detector program, two other programs 
were said to have failed at implementing the initiative.  Two middle management 
members interviewed noted that the F/A-22 aircraft program was an example of a failed 
attempt to use the initiative.  And another participant described the increase in manpower 
requirements by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) offices, recently relocated to the 
Air Force Materiel Command Product Centers, over their previous manpower levels used 
while located at the Pentagon as a failure at implementing the initiative of interest.  
Failures at using the initiative were also discussed at the process level.   
 Examples of process level failures at initiative utilization were noted by two 
participants.  One participant discussed how the Air Force’s process for reprogramming 
funds, which allows money to be used for programs other than what it was originally 
slated for, does not enact the initiative.  The impression among the Air Force workforce 
is that Congress is why it takes too long to approve reprogramming.  The participant’s 
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office checked and found out that Congress only takes thirty of the hundred and 
fifty-eight day cycle to reprogram funding; the rest is taken up by the Air Force.  So if 
money has to be reprogrammed above certain approval thresholds, it takes an average of 
a hundred and thirty days just to process the request through the Pentagon.   
The other process level failure example involved an attempt to do a zero baseline 
of all work in a SPO at Electronic Systems Center.  This exercise was originally designed 
to challenge the value-added contribution of every activity that the program office was 
doing by forcing each activity and report to justify its contribution.  SPO personnel were 
not interested in doing it.  This was clearly a failure at implementing the initiative.  After 
participants were asked about successes and failures at using the initiative of interest, 
they were asked questions about acquisition reform initiatives in general.    
Being Successful at Implementing Any Acquisition Reform Initiative. 
 The last two interview questions were applicable to acquisition reform initiatives 
on a broader scale.  The first of these two questions asked participants what they think it 
takes to be successful at utilizing any acquisition reform initiative.  A range of themes 
emerged from their responses.  The most frequently occurring theme was seen among 
eleven interview excerpts from seven participants.  The second most frequent theme 
came from seven excerpts among seven participants.  The third most frequent theme was 
common among five excerpts from five participants.  And the fourth most common 
theme was from six excerpts among four participants.  The remaining themes arose from 
four excerpts among three participants or less.  All of the themes about what it takes to 
make any acquisition reform initiative successful are summarized in Appendix D, and 
listed below in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence.   
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• Consistent message from the top 
• Senior leadership buy-in; support and advocacy for initiative from senior 
leaders 
• Be very specific in what the initiative says and in what is expected of those 
who use it 
• Behavior of leaders has to reinforce philosophy behind the initiative 
• It takes time to successfully implement an initiative 
• Non-acquisition perspective; initiative should be written for a broad audience 
and by individuals with more than just an acquisition background  
• Equip people to use the initiative; teach people about the initiative, train them 
to use it, provide them with the resources to implement it  
• Buy-in from middle management (i.e., GM/GS-15s, Senior Executive Service 
members, System Program Directors, Center Commanders, and PEO level 
leadership) 
• Marketing; show people in the acquisition trenches how the initiative will 
make their jobs better, more effective and efficient, and how it will help the 
warfighters 
• Buy-in from people in the acquisition trenches and their desire to succeed 
• More than just support; teams have to be pushed to change 
• Teamwork 
• Hold people accountable 
• Focus on changing the acquisition culture 
• Downplay buzzwords like “acquisition reform;” those words are overused and 
people outside of Product Centers think they do not apply to them  
• Ingenuity because one size initiative does not fit all programs 
• Trust of leadership 
• Leadership from program managers not functional leads 
• Freedom to use common sense 
• Empowerment 
• Reality based acquisitions management 
• Enthusiasm 
• Buy-in from operational leadership 
• Communication 
 
Important Elements of an Acquisition Reform Initiative. 
Lastly, after interview participants were asked about what they considered to be 
the keys to successful initiative implementation, they were asked what was important to 
them in any acquisition reform initiative.  Many of the themes that emerged from the data 
mirrored the characteristics of good metrics found within literature.  The most recurring 
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theme was from six interview excerpts among five participants.  The next three most 
recurring themes were each common among four excerpts from four participants.  The 
other themes produced came from five excerpts from three participants or less.  Each 
theme about what is important in an initiative is summarized in Appendix D, and listed 
below in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence. 
• Focus on the mission of the Air Force and getting something to the 
warfighters 
• Be beneficial to the acquisition grunts and the end users 
• Makes sense 
• Follow through; see it through to the end 
• Do not make initiatives just so they are easy to measure, they should be useful 
• Knowing the motive behind the initiative; seeing how it fits into the big 
picture 
• Expectations management 
• Improves performance 
• Clearly defined; it is communicated well with examples 
• Buy-in for it from all levels 
• Leadership and advocacy for the initiative 
• Frees people up to innovate 
• Understandable 
• Provides specific plan 
• Cannot be restrictive 
• Culture changing 
• Does not lose what is good about current efforts 
• Attacks other than on the margin (i.e., it attacks funding stability, 
requirements stability, expectations management) 
 
Summary  
After the interview data were carefully examined using methods modeled after 
Creswell (2003:142-146,196) and Isabella (1990:7-41), excerpts from participants’ 
responses that represented the core of their answers to each question were grouped by the 
themes that emerged.  Appendix D visually summarizes the details about each theme that 
this chapter describes; it captures all of the recurrent themes that emerged from the data 
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during the qualitative analysis, the total number of excerpts that represented each 
corresponding theme, the total number of interview participants who provided the 
excerpts, and the percentage of participants who discussed each theme.  Those themes 
revealed participants’ opinions about the kinds of metrics they would use to measure the 
“Focus on results, not process” initiative’s success, the meaning and goals of the 
initiative, the next step in achieving the initiative’s goals, how they heard about it, the 
kind of support initiative implementation is receiving, successes and failures at initiative 
utilization, and how to make generic initiatives successful.  Now the data analysis will be 
combined with the steps to create metrics and attributes of good metrics from the 
literature and applied to the initiative of interest to draw conclusions and make 
recommendations for further action.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This chapter presents conclusions drawn from the data analysis and makes 
implementable recommendations to help the sponsor of this research and the acquisition 
community more effectively utilize the initiative of interest.  This research has attempted 
to help senior Air Force leaders know how well the “Focus on results, not process” 
initiative is working and build a framework for developing measures of success for 
corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives.  That metrics framework was built by 
reviewing literature and distilling the steps involved in creating metrics down into three 
universal steps and the attributes of good metrics into a core set of attributes, by 
performing a qualitative data analysis on interview data gathered from acquisition 
practitioners, and by then applying those elements to the initiative of interest as a case 
study and recommending metrics for the initiative as a result.  The following sections 
discuss the conclusions and recommendations reached through this research, and describe 
the steps involved in the follow-on quantitative phase of the research.   
 
Conclusions 
Five conclusions were drawn from the interview data.  A breakdown in 
communication about what the initiative meant occurred throughout the acquisition 
workforce; no consistent definition for the initiative was found among participants except 
among the participants who helped author the initiative and those who work in ACE 
offices.  Next, it was determined that disconnects exist between the middle management 
level and the other management levels on several fronts.  Middle management shared a 
unanimous view on what the initiative was intended to accomplish, but that view differed 
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from the view that senior leaders and SPO level workers shared.  Middle management 
also did not appear to see the connection between the initiative and the Agile Acquisition 
concept that both senior leaders and SPO level workers did.  As discussed in detail later, 
the relationship between middle management’s disconnects with the other management 
levels may be due in part to some bias towards the initiative originator.  Another 
conclusion is that participants perceive that administrative hurdles to implementing the 
initiative are being put up by organizations and agencies outside of participants’ chains of 
command.  It was also concluded that there are differing perceptions about to whom the 
initiative applies.  Lastly, it was noted that the use of the initiative may not be the best 
way to bring about the desired changes.  The following sections provide a more in depth 
description of the conclusions reached through this research. 
Breakdown in Communication of Initiative Definition.          
The first conclusion reached through the data analysis is that there was a 
breakdown in communication of what the “Focus on results, not process” initiative 
meant.  No consistent definition for the initiative was presented by the participants except 
by those participants who helped write the initiative and those who work in ACE offices 
helping other organizations implement the initiative (New Acquisition Center Provides 
Warfighting Capabilities, 2001; Lightning Bolts, 2004).  Many people took the initiative 
to mean that if the acquisition process in question was not a law, then break it.  But, 
according authors of the initiative, what was intended was for people to look at the non 
value-added processes and challenge the ones that do not make sense, and make a case 
for why a process should not be used and get a waiver for it.  The processes were not 
meant to be ignored, but neither were they meant to be stumbling blocks along the way to 
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providing a capability to the end customer.  One participant who works closely with the 
implementation of this initiative through their work with the Acquisition Center of 
Excellence (ACE) offices summed it up well when she said:   
 “… they [the 2002 Lightning Bolt initiatives] were deployed but there wasn’t a 
fanfare, a marketing campaign – there wasn’t enough communication with the 
field on what was really meant by it.  And so, what happened was, I think people 
made their own interpretations as what was meant by it and so one of the 
consequences was that some people said, hey, discipline goes out, all I have to say 
is I want to do this in the spirit of transformation the spirit of vague acquisition I 
should be able to do it, right?  Well, that isn’t necessarily true.  You still have to 
provide reasons why you want to do something and that make sense consistent 
with the regulations and laws that we have.  You usually can waive things but you 
can’t just waive them without having a reason to waive them.  You still have to 
make your case and you don’t have to have a stack of papers this high to make a 
case but you still have to make case.  So probably you may want to skip that step, 
it’s like, I just want to do it so I should be allowed to do it, right?  Well, no you 
should make a case for it.” 
 
Disconnects Between Management Levels. 
A second conclusion, related to the first, is that there is a disconnect between what 
both senior Air Force leaders and SPO level workers think the initiative was meant to 
accomplish and what the middle management level leadership thinks.  The people at the 
senior leader and the SPO worker ends of the management chain seem to have a clearer 
understanding of what the Lightning Bolt was supposed to mean and think that getting rid 
of the non value-added processes is a good thing.  For example, senior leaders provided 
guidance on how to apply the initiative and on what the initiative means in the form of 
policy letters, directives, and briefings (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003; 
Department of the Air Force, 10 July 2003; Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002).  
In addition, SPO level workers provided numerous examples of success stories at 
implementing the initiative within their program offices, showing a clear understanding 
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of the initiative and active use of it.  However, middle management thinks the initiative is 
a “dead horse,” as several middle management participants called it, and they think that 
the Air Force is not even really pursuing the “Focus on results, not process” philosophy.  
Many of them cited the Hammer training that they are being required to attend which 
tells them that process is everything and that the results will follow, and so this initiative 
is counter to the training they are receiving.  The majority of middle management 
participants interviewed shared this view, though that is not to say that they all thought 
the approach they perceived the Air Force to be taking (i.e., process focused versus 
results focused) was the right one.  
The disconnect between management levels may be partially due to some bias the 
middle management appears to have towards the originator of the Lightning Bolt 
initiatives.  This is visible in some of the participants’ comments.  For instance one 
middle management member said “this initiative really didn't do anything to me, but to be 
honest with ya', I thought it was a parroting of something that Mrs. Druyun heard out of 
the Chief's mouth...”  Another middle management commented, “I'll tell you, you know 
the tension between, and tension is a very kind term, between Dr. Sambur and Darlene 
Druyun, you know, I -- I can't imagine there being any way that he would fully embrace, 
you know, the things that you left behind…  Darlene is gone, Darlene's policies are 
gone.”   And a third middle management member who was interviewed said “my honest 
opinion is I'm not sure it [the initiative] means much of anything, to tell you the truth, I 
mean, when Mrs. Druyun came up with the last set of Lightning Bolts, she was just 
lookin' -- I mean, it's more of a -- of a -- it's more of a buzz word to me than anything, 
you know, ‘Focus on Results, Not Process’.”   
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In addition, middle management does not seem to see any connection between the 
Lightning Bolt initiative and the Agile Acquisition philosophy.  One middle management 
participant put it this way: 
“But, you know, Agile Acquisition is good.  Get the bureaucracy out of the way, 
that's the -- that starts the -- you know, the policy stream of Dr. Sambur.  Better 
systems engineering, incentivizing systems engineering, expectations 
management, realistic cost estimates.  All those things are -- you know, are now 
the objectives of, you know, whatever we want to call it, reformation, 
transformation, re-engineering… What you don't hear, you know, focus on 
results, not process.  That -- that's still a good concept, but it's not what people are 
thinking or saying.” 
 
The initiative of interest was meant to serve as one of the tools to help accomplish Agile 
Acquisition (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003).  The initiative and Agile 
Acquisition have the same goals of improving the speed and credibility of the acquisition 
community, and people are expected to tradeoff non-critical program elements (i.e., get 
rid of non value-added processes) as part of Agile Acquisition which is also what the 
initiative was meant to drive (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003).   
Administrative Obstacles to Initiative Implementation from Outside Agencies. 
 Another conclusion is that several administrative obstacles to successfully 
implementing the initiative exist.  Participants clearly stated that they are getting the 
support they need from their immediate bosses, but that there are obstacles from outside 
organizations and agencies; for example, added oversight from Congress, having to work 
with the Department of Defense and other services, and having to get approvals from 
people outside of their decision chain of command.  Thirty percent of participants stated 
that those outside their chain of command, who can still influence their level of success at 
implementing the initiative, are not providing the support participants need.  Numerous 
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participants also included the Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD) among their 
biggest perceived roadblocks.  For example, one former PEO said they agreed 
“absolutely, one hundred percent” with other participants that OSD is one of the main 
places they start hitting roadblocks.  The ChemSentry program follow-on buy of 
chemical testers, discussed previously in chapter four, was cited as an example of OSD’s 
counterproductive involvements.       
Differing Perceptions About Who is to Implement the Initiative. 
In addition to there being roadblocks to implementing the initiative, people 
outside of the acquisition community do not think the initiative applies to them.  
According to some participants, the dubbing of the initiative as an acquisition reform 
initiative led people within the requirements arena (e.g., Air Combat Command), people 
in the testing community, and those in the logistics and weapon system sustainment 
community to think the initiative was only geared towards weapon system acquisition 
offices.  The negative responses from many of the people approached to participate in 
this research cited the point that they did not think the initiative applied to them as the 
reason they could not help with this research; Test and Evaluation Centers, Air Logistics 
Centers, and an Air Force Space Command System Program Office (SPO) did not 
participate in this research for that reason.     
Initiative May Not Be Most Effective Way to Bring About Desired Changes. 
The last conclusion made from the data analysis is that using an initiative like this 
may not be the most effective way to accomplish the desired behavioral change.  Just 
sending out an initiative and leaving it up to the workers in the acquisition trenches to 
figure out how to apply it will not cut it.  The need for leadership and people’s fears of 
 
 72
change and failure need to be addressed.  Participants, including the middle management 
personnel, consistently said that senior leaders need to be more engaged and regularly 
vocal about the importance of things like the initiative for it to be successful.  After 
conclusions were reached, recommendations were developed using both the data analysis 
and literature review findings.   
 
Implementable Recommendations 
Several implementable recommendations are presented in the following sections.  
The first recommendation was developed by applying the framework for developing 
metrics that this research has produced to the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.  
As previously discussed, five categories of metrics are suggested for the initiative, 
specifically schedule, customer satisfaction, cost, credibility, and performance.  The first 
recommendation of this research will only address the metric category of customer 
satisfaction because the categories of schedule, cost, credibility, and performance have 
been previously addressed by other Air Force agencies and because cost, schedule, and 
performance metrics are already broadly used across the Air Force.  The 
recommendations of this research attempt to focus on areas that will be of the most 
interest and utility to the research sponsor and to the Air Force. 
Customer Satisfaction Metrics to Measure Initiative Success. 
 This research recommends the use of customer satisfaction metrics to measure the 
success of the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.  Customer satisfaction is the key 
to organizational success (Gibson and others, 2003:238).  No matter how precisely a 
schedule is maintained, how much cost savings are realized, how credible the end 
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customer thinks the acquisition community is, or what exceptional performance a weapon 
system or process has, if the customer is not satisfied with the result, the acquisition 
community has failed.  Customer satisfaction is described as the extent to which a 
process or product meets a customer’s expectations (Kotler and Armstrong, 2001:9; 
Naumann and Jackson, 1999:71; Zeithaml and Bitner, 2006:75).  The dimensions of 
customer satisfaction can be applied across the other categories of metrics (e.g., schedule, 
credibility, and performance) to suggest metrics for the initiative.  It should be noted that 
multiple customer satisfaction metrics could apply and one size does not fit all (INCOSE, 
1998:9); the following are examples that apply, but future research could provide 
additional customer satisfaction metrics.  A customer satisfaction metric that applies to 
schedule is timeliness (Ellis and Curtis, 1995; Hayes, 1992:8).  Customer satisfaction 
metrics for performance are reliability and perceived quality (Ellis and Curtis, 1995; 
Naumann and Jackson, 1999:72).  And a customer satisfaction metric for the area of 
credibility is responsiveness (Ellis and Curtis, 1995; Hayes, 1992:8; Naumann and 
Jackson, 1999:72).  A customer satisfaction metric for cost is not suggested because, 
according to Hammer (2001:103), it tells very little if anything about the business.  The 
visual depiction of how the dimensions of customer satisfaction can be applied across the 
metric categories of schedule, cost, performance, and credibility to produce generally 
applicable customer satisfaction metrics for the initiative is displayed below as Table 6.  
The list of metrics is general since the attributes of each dimension are very product 
specific, meaning the metrics should be tailored for a better fit depending upon what 
product or process they are applied to (Naumann and Jackson, 1999:73).  One size metric 
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does not fit all (INCOSE, 1998:9).  The development of more specific program and 
process metrics could be explored as part of future research.   
Table 6.  Generally Applicable Customer Satisfaction Metrics 
 Dimensions of Customer Satisfaction Metrics 
Schedule Timeliness 
Performance Reliability and perceived quality 
Credibility Responsiveness 
 
In addition to suggesting metrics for the “Focus on results, not process” initiative, 
this research makes several other recommendations to improve the implementation of the 
initiative and future initiatives.  These additional recommendations are discussed in 
greater detail below.  Following those recommendations are suggestions for future 
research and a summary of this research.   
Innovation Training for Acquisition Workforce. 
The acquisition workforce needs to continue to be recruited and trained to think 
outside the box and to not always follow the cookbook recipe.  The workforce has 
traditionally been trained in how to use the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the 
Department of Defense 5000 Series, source selection guides, and other guides and 
instructions about what processes and procedures to follow, but if the acquisition 
community is now expected to be innovative, not have the business as usual mindset, 
think for themselves, be creative, and change how acquisitions are conducted, then they 
have to be trained in how to do that.  There is a need for this kind of training among the 
workforce.  This is evidenced by one middle management participant who was speaking 
to acquisition practitioners on Lightning Bolt initiatives and a woman in the audience 
said, “I used to be able to sit down at my desk and open my cookbook and follow the 
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recipe and I'd get done with the product.  You took my recipe book away from me and I 
don't know what to do.”  The objective now is not to have people open the book and 
follow it step by step, but instead to think for themselves and do what is smart.  But they 
have to be trained how to do that.  One avenue to train the acquisition community is to 
train people in modern business philosophies and tactics, like strategic purchasing, the 
entrepreneurial mindset, and organizational management, versus the standard government 
process and procedure oriented training.   
More specifically, several contracting division chiefs noted that contracting 
personnel should be specifically targeted for training because they are often seen as 
roadblocks.  The division chiefs also stated that many contracting people are very 
regimented in how they do business and if it is not specifically authorized in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation they are not willing to do it.  In addition, many civilians entering 
the government sector today are taught little about the military in their educations, and it 
is unlikely that they will put the emphasis on the warfighter in their work if they do not 
have an understanding of what the warfighter does or goes through on the battlefield.  
Participants suggested that one way to sensitize government civilians, specifically those 
in the contracting career field, to the warfighters’ needs is to include them in Professional 
Military Education (PME) classes.  This is being done to some extent already, but it 
should be expanded.  Participants also distinctly identified the need for personnel at the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Contract Management Agency 
to receive PME.       
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Create Functional Area Guiding Principles. 
  The next recommendation is that all functional areas (e.g., engineering, finance, 
program management) within the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
(SAF/AQ) office create a set of guiding principles for the people within their functional 
areas in the acquisition community that would spell out what is expected of those people 
as they participate in this transformation movement.  The guiding principles created by 
SAF/AQC for contracting personnel could act as the template for the other functional 
areas.  There is a need for an expectations guide; participants from the ACE offices noted 
that they get numerous calls from people asking what is expected of them in this new 
acquisition environment and from people asking how to do acquisition without the 
cookbook.  Principles like the ones SAF/AQC has included in part one of the Air Force 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Supplement (Department of the Air Force, 1 May 
2003) give people an idea of what they are expected to do, how they are expected to act, 
and what they are expected to accomplish.   
Make Waiver Process Easier. 
The next recommendation is to make the waiver process less burdensome and 
faster.  The initiative of interest is designed to enable acquisition practitioners to 
challenge the things that do not make sense; in turn, the process used to make these 
challenges needs to be addressed.  It takes so much effort and time to get a waiver for 
regulations, Air Force Instructions, and other required processes that you might as well 
have just done the process or followed the regulation or instruction that you were trying 
to change.  Many participants said the current method is just too much trouble.  This view 
is supported by one of the General Officers interviewed who stated the following.  
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“So what's important for me in an initiative is that it be something I can do and it 
would be value added and it would actually cut my work.  In other words, don't 
tell me… I can have an exception to somethin' if I have to go ask for -- you know, 
I have to go sell this exception to every layer of bureaucracy I've gotta work with.  
It just doesn't -- it's -- it's just here, let me do it the regular way.”    
 
Clarify Future Initiatives. 
It is also recommended that the next set of initiatives to be sent out not use 
buzzwords like acquisition or acquisition reform; rather, they should be very specific, and 
metrics and a commander’s intent statement should be released along with the initiatives.  
One middle management participant noted that when the term acquisition reform 
initiative is used “the rest of the Air Force thinks it only applies to the acquisition world.”   
Future initiatives should also be well defined and not general statements.  
Numerous interview participants noted that the most recent series of Lightning Bolt 
initiatives greatly differed from the previous initiative releases in that it was vague and 
too general.  Specificity leaves less room for ambiguity and misinterpretation.  Assigning 
specific goals or tasks, which in this case would be a specific initiative, has been proven 
to improve performance (Latham and Locke, 1979:68-80; Latham and Yukl, 1975:824-
843; Locke, 1968:157; Taylor, 2001:64).  Specific initiatives, in turn, will aid in the 
creation of specific metrics.   
It is also recommended that measures of success for the next initiatives be 
established before the initiatives are released.  This will help clarify what the initiatives 
are trying to accomplish and what changes they are trying to bring about, and help 
determine when the initiative has been accomplished.  
In addition, a commander’s intent statement should accompany the initiatives.  A 
commander’s intent statement will give those expected to implement the initiatives some 
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insight into the thinking behind them, and will allow those who implement them the 
freedom to use their initiative and judgment in a manner that is consistent with the aims 
of higher commanders (Department of the Air Force, 10 July 2003:2).      
Create Database of Initiative Implementation Success and Failure Stories. 
 The next recommendation is that the Secretariat of the Air Force Acquisition 
Center of Excellence (SAF/ACE) office compile a database that contains examples of 
successful and failed attempts to use the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.  
Multiple interview participants expressed an interest in seeing such a database created.  It 
would serve as a way to make the initiative of interest, which is more general and 
conceptual than previous Lightning Bolt initiatives, more practical and applicable for 
acquisition practitioners.  Several participants suggested that it could help dispel fear and 
apprehension about trying something new and failing by providing examples of programs 
that failed at using the initiatives, but were still rewarded for being innovative and for 
trying.  The success and failure examples presented in this research can serve as the 
starting point for the database. 
 It is suggested that a link to the database be posted on the SAF/ACE internet 
homepage.  And the inclusion of a feature story in Agile Acquisition:  The Air Force 
Acquisition Newsletter on one of the successes or failures should be considered, with the 
monthly stories alternating between failure and success.            
ACE Office Road Shows. 
 If they are not already doing so, it is also recommended that the SAF/ACE office 
coordinate with the Center ACE offices to present road shows specifically focused on the 
initiatives they are overseeing, like the initiative this research is focusing on, at bases 
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throughout the Air Force.  Road shows could be the avenue by which the ACE offices 
clearly convey the intent behind the initiatives and explain what they were meant to 
accomplish.  Road shows would be a display of leadership’s support for and advocacy of 
the initiatives.  They could be the path to train and educate people about the initiatives 
and obtain feedback from the troops on initiative implementation.  Additionally, they 
could be a time to share stories of successful initiative utilization and stories where 
people or programs were not successful.  
Consistent Statement of Initiative Support from Senior Air Force Leaders. 
 Lastly, it is recommended that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force be asked to 
include a statement of support for continued acquisition reform, stressing the importance 
of compliance with acquisition initiatives in his monthly Chief’s Sight Picture newsletter.  
And it is recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force be asked to make a similar 
statement in his Secretary’s Vector newsletter.  Such statements would address the 
prevailing and pervasive request from interview participants and others for consistent, 
continual, vocal support for the initiative of interest from the Chief and other senior Air 
Force leaders.  The Chief and the Secretary’s continued and open support would enable 
those expected to implement the initiatives to really challenge the party-line way of doing 
acquisitions, become innovative, and change the acquisition process. 
 This research has made several recommendations to better measure the success of 
the initiative’s performance, and to improve its implementation and that of future 
initiatives.  Eight recommendations are made in total.  The first is to use customer 
satisfaction metrics to measure the initiative’s level of success in the areas of schedule, 
credibility, and performance.  The second recommendation is to continue to shift the 
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focus of acquisition workforce training from the traditional process and procedures 
cookbook method of doing acquisitions to innovative, business oriented training.  And it 
is recommended that Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Defense Contract 
Management Agency civilians be included in Professional Military Education classes.  
The third recommendation is that guiding principles be created by each functional lead 
within SAF/AQ for those in the acquisition community within their functional areas, 
using those established by SAF/AQC as a model.  The fourth recommendation is to 
examine the waiver process and make it more user friendly.  The fifth recommendation is 
clarify future initiatives; this can be done by making the initiatives very specific, sending 
out metrics and a commander’s intent message with the initiatives when they are first sent 
out, and not using buzzwords (e.g., acquisition reform).  The sixth recommendation is to 
create a database of success stories and failures at implementing the “Focus on results, 
not process” initiative.  The seventh recommendation is for the Acquisition Center of 
Excellence (ACE) offices to hold regular road shows discussing the initiative and others.  
The eighth recommendation is to ask the senior Air Force leadership to send out regular 
and clear statements of support for the initiative and acquisition reform efforts.  Table 7 is 
a summary of the recommendations made by this research. 
Table 7.  Summary of Research Recommendations 
 Recommendations 
1. Customer satisfaction metrics to measure success of initiative 
2. Innovation training for acquisition workforce 
3. Create functional area guiding principles 
4. Make waiver process easier 
5. Clarify future initiatives 
6. Create database of initiative implementation success and failure stories 
7. ACE office road shows 
8. Consistent statement of initiative support from senior Air Force leaders 
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Future Research  
In addition to drawing conclusions and making recommendations based on the 
literature and data analysis, it is suggested that future studies continue the research stream 
begun by this project.  The future research would consist of a quantitative analysis that 
would validate the findings of the qualitative research.   
As part of future research, a questionnaire can be constructed using the data 
gathered from the interviews.  The questionnaire can be used to evaluate the generated 
metrics along the dimensions of “good” metrics; specific metrics that apply to the 
categories of metrics this research suggests can then be identified during future research.  
A questionnaire development process is provided below. 
 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
During the second phase of the research, a panel of experts can provide an 
independent assessment of whether or not the metrics suggested for the Lighting Bolt of 
interest possess the characteristics of good metrics.  They can use a questionnaire 
constructed using the data gathered from the interviews.  The questionnaire can be used 
to evaluate the generated metrics along the dimensions of “good” metrics.  The metrics 
can be numerically ranked against the dimensions of good metrics using a seven-point 
interval scale.  Univariate statistics can then be used to analyze the central tendency, 
dispersion, and score distributions of the resulting data. 
Response Format. 
A seven point scale can be used for the quantitative phase because seven point 
scales are the best choice in terms of subjects being able to clearly distinguish scale 
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values from one another, and the best for reliability (Cox, 1980:414; Schwarz and others, 
1991:571).  The rating scale for this research also consists of positive numbers because 
scales being used to assess the intensity of individual attributes should be formatted from 
zero-to-positive values; this stresses that the question being asked deals with the presence 
or absence of the given attribute, instead of the presence of its opposite (Schwarz and 
others,1991:578).  It can be determined in the quantitative phase whether the survey 
instrument will use rating scales tailored to fit each attribute or if it is more appropriate to 
use a more universal scale for all of the attributes.  These findings support using the 
measurement scale described above. 
Validation. 
A panel of experts can be provided with a list of all the metrics suggested by the 
interview data.  They can then be asked to refine the list and regroup the metrics as 
necessary, in order to eliminate redundancies.  The panel of experts can then be asked to 
quantitatively assess the refined list of metrics against the attributes of good metrics.  By 
completing these two tasks, the panel of experts can provide content validity for the 
survey instrument developed.  The survey instrument can be further validated in a follow-
on effort that collects data from a representative sample, analyzing the responses 
statistically. 
Measure of Central Tendency. 
 The mean rating for each metric can be calculated across all the participants.  
These ratings can then be ranked from highest to lowest, starting with the most important 
attribute.  Then the ratings can be ranked against the second most important, and so on.  
The hierarchy of attribute importance can be based on the findings of the qualitative 
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phase of the research.  This can show how the average participant rates each metric 
against the characteristics of good metrics. 
But because the mean gives more weight to outliers that could skew the data, the 
median score for each metric rating can also be determined to further describe the central 
tendency (Dooley, 2001:321). 
Measure of Dispersion. 
 Next, the dispersion of the data can be analyzed to determine how much the data 
varies above or below the mean.  In this context, this value tells how much the ratings of 
this small sample differ among themselves (Kachigan, 1991:41).  The standard deviation 
can be calculated to describe the data dispersion because it incorporates the distance from 
the mean for each observation, versus using the range which only uses the two most 
extreme observations and is susceptible to skewness by outliers (Dooley, 2001:321).   
If participants’ ratings vary greatly from one another, it may be an indicator that 
either the metrics or attributes are ill-defined, or it could mean that there is something 
unclear about the format of the questionnaire.  Conversely, clustered ratings (i.e., ratings 
that are closely grouped together) may support that the questionnaire is sound, and they 
may provide a more accurate measurement of the quality of the metrics against the 
attributes.        
Score Distributions. 
Then, the score distributions can be shown through rank-ordering and frequency 
counts.  Following Nunnally’s (1959:46) suggestion for analyzing data when the number 
of subjects is small, the survey instrument score distributions will be described by rank-
ordering.  For example, if a metric has the highest score out of five metrics for the 
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dimension of simplicity, it can be easily understood how simple the metric is in 
comparison to the other metrics.  After the central tendency and dispersion of the data are 
analyzed, the metrics can be ranked to illustrate which metrics possess the highest 
number of good attributes in comparison to one another.  
And for a broader application, the frequency of how many times each metric is 
rated as having the various attributes and how many times they were rated as not having 
the attributes will be interpreted from the data.  This can provide a more generalized 
rating of ‘yes - a particular metric is simple, or is meaningful to the customer, or relates 
to the strategic goals of the organization,’ and so on, or a generalized rating of ‘no - it is 
not simple,’ etc.  Analysis of the quantitative data can provide support for conclusions 
reached through the qualitative phase of the research. 
 
Discussion 
This project was designed to help better understand the effectiveness of Air Force 
acquisition initiatives, using the Lightning Bolt initiatives as a case study, and to establish 
acquisition based measures of success.  Specifically, this research focused on the 
Lightning Bolt 2002 initiative that is most closely linked with the goal set for the Air 
Force to improve speed and credibility:  “Focus on results, not process” (Senate Armed 
Services Committee, 2002).  This research examined the literature to provide a historical 
context for the Lightning Bolt 2002 acquisition initiatives, and to explain the importance 
and composition of metrics.  From the literature a three step generic process for creating 
metrics and the core attributes of good metrics were identified.  Next, the research 
described the interview process used to collect data and the qualitative method used to 
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analyze the data.  Then the research explained the themes that evolved from the data and 
the resulting conclusions.  Finally, the research made recommendations that could be 
implemented to further improve the performance of the initiative and made suggestions 
for future research opportunities.  
This study gives Air Force leaders clear, implementable metrics that can be used 
as measures of success for the “Focus on results, not process” initiative, and provides 
recommendations that can be used to improve this initiative’s performance and that of 
future corporate Air Force acquisition initiatives.  This study also gives Air Force leaders 
insight into whether or not this initiative and others like it are an appropriate and effective 
way to drive the changes they are meant to bring about.  Finally, from a broader 
perspective, the framework used in this study can be used to develop measures of success 
for other corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives. 
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Appendix A:  Interview Assistance Request Letter 
 
23 August 2003 
 
Colonel Rita Jordan 
AFIT/EN 
2950 Hobson Way 
WP AFB, OH  45433-7765 
 
Mrs. Marty Evans 
Director, AF Acquisition Center of Excellence 
Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) 
SAF/ACE 
1060 Air Force Pentagon 
Washington, DC  20330-1060 
 
Dear Mrs. Evans 
 
Thank you for the sponsorship the Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) office 
is providing for the thesis research of Capt Carey Petit.  Col Ralph DiCicco’s help has 
been immeasurable in starting her research down a path that will prove useful to the Air 
Force acquisition community.  I am writing to you to ask for your continued assistance 
with the next step of this research. 
A large portion of Capt Petit’s research requires interviewing system program 
office (SPO) members at various managerial levels who have had experience with the 
2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process.”  Ideally, 
individuals throughout the chain of command at selected SPOs within all of the Air Force 
Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers would be targeted for interviews.  The target 
audience would ideally consist of:  40-50 people; an equal number of people to be 
interviewed at each of the Product and Logistics Centers; individuals who hold varying 
levels of managerial responsibility (e.g., people ranging from program managers, to 
Development System Managers, to System Program Directors, and potentially all the 
way to Center Commanders).  The target timeframe for the interview process would 
ideally be to identify the interview subjects by 30 Sep 03 and complete the interviews by 
31 Oct 03. 
I would like to ask for the assistance of the ACE office in identifying individuals 
within this target audience who have experience with the “Focus on results, not process” 
initiative.  It is my understanding that the Center level ACE offices have the resources to 
identify such individuals at their respective Centers.  Any assistance your office or the 
Center ACE offices can offer in identifying these interview subjects by name, location, 
phone number, and email address would be a great help.  For your convenience, a draft 
letter inviting SPO members to participate in this interview process is attached for your 
signature.  Capt Petit would like to send the letter to the SPO members on your behalf, 
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once the Center ACE offices have identified them.  Your continued support of this 
research effort is greatly appreciated.   
 
 
If you have any questions, please contact Capt Petit by phone at (937) 252-3164 
or by email at carey.petit@afit.edu.  Your help in locating interview subjects who are 
already familiar with the initiative will greatly facilitate the interview portion of this 
research.  Thank you for your help with this matter.   
 
      Sincerely 
 
 
 
       RITA A. JORDAN, Colonel, USAF 
       Associate Dean  
       Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
   (Thesis Committee Chair) 
 
 
 
 
   CAREY PETIT, Captain, USAF 
       Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Attachment: 
Interview Invitation Letter 
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Appendix B:  Interview Invitation Letter 
 
31 October 2003 
1560 Wilson Blvd. 
Suite 901 
Arlington, VA  22209 
Potential Interview Subject 
1050 Air Force Pentagon 
Washington, D.C.  20330-1050 
Dear (Interview Participant’s Name) 
Through the assistance of the Center ACE offices, you are one of a very small 
group who have been identified as having experience using or knowledge of the 2002 
acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process.”  As your schedule 
permits, Capt Carey Petit would like to set up an appointment to interview you about 
your experiences with this acquisition reform initiative.  Capt Petit is a graduate student 
at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  Her master’s thesis research is on developing 
measures of success for the “Focus on results, not process” initiative. 
Capt Petit’s research will include interviews with people throughout Air Force 
Materiel Command who hold positions at various managerial levels.  I am personally 
interested in what you, the front-line acquisition practitioners, think about these 
initiatives and their appropriateness.  Most importantly, this will give me the necessary 
insight to make changes and improvements that help us all serve the Air Force better. 
Attached is a copy of the interview questions that will be asked.  However, the 
interview is meant to be only partially structured to allow for the free flow of ideas that 
are outside the confines of the preset interview questions and to maximize the time 
available for open discussion.  Information collected during the interview will be 
completely confidential; no individual will be identified in any way in Capt Petit’s thesis 
or related published articles.  The interview questions have been approved through the 
Air Force Personnel Center and assigned the official survey number of USAF SCN 03-
098. 
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Thank you in advance for your willingness to assist Capt Petit in her research 
efforts.  She will be in touch with your office to set up an appointment for your interview.  
If you have any questions, Capt Petit can be reached by phone at (937) 252-3164 and by 
email at carey.petit@afit.edu.                                             
                                                                       Sincerely 
 
                                                                                    // SIGNED// 
 
 
MARTHA T. EVANS 
Director 
Acquisition Center of Excellence 
Attachment: 
Interview Question List 
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Attachment:  Interview Question List 
 
1. What do you think the 2002 Lightning Bolt “Focus on results, not process” means? 
2. What do you think are the results it is trying to accomplish?  What are its desired 
outcomes? 
3. Do you think these goals are appropriate? 
4. What metrics would you use to measure those results or outcomes? 
5. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the “Focus on results, not 
process” acquisition reform initiative? 
6. What should be the next step in “focusing on results”? 
7. How did you hear about the “Focus on results, not process” initiative? 
8. How is your organization implementing it? 
9. What has been your role in the development and/or implementation of this initiative? 
10. How would you know if you are succeeding at implementing the initiative? 
11. What kind of support is your organization getting in order to implement the initiative?  
12. Are you getting the support you need to implement the initiative? 
13. How is your organization supporting you in your attempts to implement the initiative? 
14. Have you heard of any success stories at implementing the initiative? 
15. Have you heard of any big failures at implementing the initiative? 
16. What do you think it takes to be successful in implementing any acquisition reform 
initiative? 
17. What is important to you in an acquisition reform initiative? 
18. Is there anything else you would like to discuss?  
19. Do you have any questions for me?  
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Appendix C:  Interview Related Exchanges 
 
23 August 2003 
 
Captain Carey Petit 
AMC P.O. Box 33768 
WP AFB, OH  45433 
 
Potential Interview Subject 
System Program Director, XXX Platform 
XXXXX AFB, XX   00000 
 
Dear (Interview Subject’s Name) 
 
I want to thank you again for agreeing to assist me with my effort to develop 
measures of success for the 2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, 
not process.”  I appreciate you taking time out of your busy schedule to participate in the 
interview we have scheduled for 23 Sep 03 at 1300hrs.  Please let me know if any 
conflicts arise with the current time we have scheduled for our interview.  I look forward 
to talking with you. 
I can be reached by phone at (937) 252-3164 and by email at carey.petit@afit.edu, 
if you have any questions.   
 
      Sincerely 
 
 
 
 
      CAREY PETIT, Capt, USAF 
      AFIT Graduate Student 
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Appendix C:  Interview Related Exchanges 
 
Interview Script 
 
NOTE:  Have interview subject fill out checklist below at the beginning of the interview 
during the set-up time (i.e., while tape recorder is being set up and other preparations are 
being made): 
 
Demographics 
 
Age and Gender? 
Occupation 
  - Functional area? 
Organization 
  - Number of organizational levels that separate you from the Center 
Commander? 
Supervisor 
  - If so, how many people do you supervise?  What are their occupations? 
Tenure 
  - Time in service?  
 
Introduction  
 
Good morning (afternoon), my name is Capt Carey Petit.  I am a student in the 
Strategic Purchasing Master’s Degree Program at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT).  The information I collect through this interview will be part of my master’s 
thesis.  My thesis is about developing measures of success for the 2002 Lighting Bolt 
initiative “Focus on results, not process.”  I want to thank you for taking time out of your 
busy schedule to answer a few questions for me.  Your help will potentially assist the Air 
Force Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) in establishing metrics for this initiative 
and in determining if such initiatives should be continued in the future, and you will 
greatly assist me in furthering my thesis work. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Let me begin by saying that everything you say today will be completely 
confidential.  Your comments will only be seen by me, my advisor, and a transcriber.  
Only general feedback on the responses of interview subjects will be used in my thesis.  
No individual will be identified in any way.  Any quotations that are used in my final 
paper will be altered in a way to conceal your identity.   
The interviews conducted during my research will be analyzed for common 
themes.  These common themes will then be used to help me write a questionnaire that 
will assess the effectiveness of the “Focus on results, not process” initiative 
implementation and the appropriateness of metrics gathered from the interview data as 
future measurements of success for the same initiative.  The questionnaire will potentially 
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be filled out by many people throughout Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and Air 
Force Space Command (AFSPC) in future research efforts. 
As I will not be able to remember everything that is said during the interview, I 
will be taking notes and would like to ask your permission to record our conversation, 
which will then later be transcribed.  No one other than me, my advisor, and a transcriber 
will read my notes or hear, or read the transcription of, the interview.  At any time, you 
can read my notes and correct any mistakes you think I have made.  And if at anytime, 
you would like to stop recording for any reason, please let me know.  If you would like, I 
will be glad to forward a copy of this interview to you after it is transcribed. 
 
Interview Format 
 
I apologize up front for watching the clock, because I do not want to take up too 
much of your time.  I have tried to limit my questions so as not to exceed 30-45 minutes.  
However, I want to stress that the interview is meant to be somewhat unstructured and 
free-flowing.  So if there is anything that you would like to discuss further please let me 
know.  Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
Interview Items 
 
To give you a brief summary of the focus of my research…  The President, 
Secretary Rumsfeld, and other senior Air Force leaders are continuing to seek ways to 
improve the Air Force’s acquisition processes through various means of acquisition 
reform.  A series of acquisition reform initiatives called “Lightning Bolts” were started in 
1995 by Ms. Darleen Druyun, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
for Acquisition Management.  My research will focus on the 2002 Lightning Bolts 
entitled “Focus on results, not process.”  This initiative drives a “clean-sheet” approach to 
acquisitions by streamlining processes in order to remove non value-added steps.  One 
recent example of this initiative in action is the rewriting of the regulations that govern 
weapon system procurement within the Department of Defense, the DoD 5000 series; 
portions of the regulation were eliminated while others were rewritten.  
 
Now, from your personal experiences, I would like you to think of acquisition reform 
initiatives, specifically the 2002 Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process.”  
Think of your role in this reform effort.  Also, try to recall the activities that surrounded 
the initiative and of your impressions of its facilitation. 
 
<<  Pause a moment  >> 
OK, let’s get started… 
 
1. What do you think the 2002 Lightning Bolt “Focus on results, not process” means? 
 
2. What do you think are the results it is trying to accomplish?  What are its desired 
outcomes? 
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3. Do you think these goals are appropriate? 
 
4. What metrics would you use to measure those results or outcomes? 
 
5. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the “Focus on results, not 
process” acquisition reform initiative? 
 
6. What should be the next step in “focusing on results”? 
 
7. How did you hear about the “Focus on results, not process” initiative? 
 
8. How is your organization implementing it? 
 
9. What has been your role in the development and/or implementation of this initiative? 
 
10. How would you know if you are succeeding at implementing the initiative? 
 
11. What kind of support is your organization getting in order to implement the initiative?  
 
12. Are you getting the support you need to implement the initiative? 
 
13. How is your organization supporting you in your attempts to implement the initiative? 
 
14. Have you heard of any success stories at implementing the initiative? 
 
15. Have you heard of any big failures at implementing the initiative? 
 
16. What do you think it takes to be successful in implementing any acquisition reform 
initiative? 
 
17. What is important to you in an acquisition reform initiative? 
 
18. Is there anything else you would like to discuss?  
  
19. Do you have any questions for me? 
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Appendix D:  Summary of Interview Themes and Participant Responses 
 
When reviewing Appendix D, be aware of the following factors:  a) more than 
one theme could apply to a participant’s response for any given interview question (e.g., 
Table 4 in chapter four shows how one response from a participant applied to the themes 
of schedule, cost, and performance); and b) the percentage of participants among whom 
the themes occurred may seem elevated due to the low number of participants who 
participated in the research (e.g., one participant equals four percent of the total 
participants). 
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Appendix D:  Summary of Interview Themes and Participant Responses (continued) 
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